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Climate change caused by human activity, and the threat of it
to our way of life, and even the practice of law, has been well
established from the scientific, economic, social and legal
perspectives. 1 Production of energy to meet human needs has been
identified as the main source of emissions of CO 2 that causes
climate change. 2

*Celeste M. Hammond is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Real Estate Law at The John Marshall Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the participants at the Kratovil Conference on Real Estate Law
& Practice held September 29, 2015, “Fracking, Energy Sources, Climate
Change & Real Estate,” and their articles in this symposium issue: David
Callies, Jennifer Cassel, Lincoln Davies, John Dernbach, Joshua Fershee, W.
James Hughes, and Richard Roddewig. She also appreciates greatly the
excellent research work of Jeffrey Mathis, JD ’16, and Priya Desai, JD ’16. The
ideas and “dirt” perspective of Virginia Harding are an integral part of this
article. Finally, she thanks the John Marshall Law Review and Executive Lead
Articles Editor Elizabeth M. Foubert for their outstanding work in preparation
of this symposium issue.
1. See Celeste Hammond, The Evolving Role for Transactional Attorneys
Responding to Client Needs in Adapting to Climate Change, 47 J. MARSHALL L.
REV . 543, 549–54 (2013) (explaining that climate change caused by human
activity impacts many aspects of society including law and the practice of law).
2. See Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Deepa Badrinarayana, Cinnamon Carlarne,
Robin Kundis Craig, John C. Dernbach, Keith H. Hirokawa, Alexandra B.
Klass, Katrina Fischer Kuh, Stephen R. Miller, Jessica Owley, Shannon
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Yet, energy is something that real estate attorneys have
typically known little to nothing about. Energy issues were seen as
falling within the domain of utility lawyers and natural resource
lawyers. However, just as real estate lawyers are not expected to be
experts in federal tax law, but rather are expected to know enough
to ask the right questions when dealing with tax attorneys to
structure transactions, the 14th Kratovil Conference on Real Estate
Law & Practice: “Fracking, Energy Sources, Climate Change & Real
Estate” makes it clear that real estate lawyers need an
understanding of the basics of energy sources, regulation and the
second order effects of energy generation and production. This
article attempts to provide some basic information on the variety of
sources of energy, including coal, oil and natural gas that
collectively are known as conventional “fossil fuels,” renewable
energy that does not cause CO2 emissions, and the recently
embraced unconventional energy produced by fracturing or
fracking. 3
Attorneys preparing to counsel their clients who wish to
develop real estate that might be suitable for fracking natural gas
out of shale rock, as well for clients who will be affected in their
ownership, development and financing of real estate impacted by
fracking, will learn about the implications of climate change and the
legal response to it in the context of fracking.
This means that energy issues and concerns will need to be
added to the real estate due diligence checklists used whenever
ownership and transactions involving real property occur. Because
the energy landscape recently has been changed by the availability
of fracked natural gas, this article raises questions about fracking
and the real estate industry.
Part I of this article considers the implications of evidence that
climate change is principally due to human activity as humans use
increasing amounts of energy. 4 The development of renewable
energy to limit carbon emissions, that are the source of the problem ,
include wind, solar, hydraulic and wave energy as substitutes for
coal and oil. Nuclear energy also has been proposed as part of the

Roesler, Jonathan Rosenbloom, Inara Scott & David Takacs, A Response to the
IPCC Fifth Assessment, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10027 (2015),
http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/facu lty_articles/414 (analyzing the IPCC Fifth
Assessment by members of the Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC)
arguing that in United States 97% of dangerous CO 2 emissions is attributable
to energy use).
3. See infra I.C (explaining how this fracked natural gas is a bridge to
renewable energy).
4. Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Live with the Trickster: Narrating
Climate Change and the Value of Resilience Thinking, University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law, Research Paper No. 152 (2016), http://ssrn.com /
abstract=2716895 (commenting on increasing difficulty of using the “Humans
as Controlling Engineers narrative” to describe humans as capable of dealing
with climate change as they have been in developing the systems that cause it).
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solution. Society’s energy needs and wants determine the economics
of the energy markets, sometimes independently of policy concerns
about the risks of climate change. The impact fracturing of natural
gas will have on the energy markets and on the risks of climate
change itself is controversial. Indeed, the concern has becom e
whether fracking is truly a “bridge” to renewable energy or merely
an energy source with a lower emission impact that causes its own
set of problems. 5
Part II looks at the relatively new business of fracking, which
reflects the successes of innovation and the limitations of this fairly
new industry.
Part III provides a primer of basic real property law about land
that may be suitable for fracking or that may be affected by
fracking. The separation of ownership between surface and subsurface mineral rights is achieved by contract, leases, and,
sometimes, by intervention of government itself. That most of the
government regulation of privately owned real property, with
respect to fracking, is state rather than federal law, may explain
how difficult and complex government regulation of land involved
in fracking to serve national and even international policies.
Part IV reviews the three categories of risk associated with
fracking: environmental, social and economic in the context of
implications for those owning, developing, financing, leasing and
using real estate.
Part V provides a conclusion; but many questions remain on
the real estate implications by fracking.

5. Joel Minor, Completing the Bridge to Nowhere: Prioritizing Oil and Gas
Emissions Regulations in the Western States, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 57, 58
(2015).
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I. THE A NTHROPOGENIC VIEW OF C LIMATE CHANGE
C ONCLUDES THAT HUMANS CAUSE CLIMATE C HANGE AND
CARBON EMISSIONS MUST BE REDUCED DRAMATICALLY
IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE THREATS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
PRINCIPALLY BY LIMITING THE BURNING OF FOSSILS LIKE
COAL , OIL, AND NATURAL GAS FOR ENERGY

A. This Explanation of the Connection Between Energy
and Climate Change Is Well Respected 6
Experts have introduced the term “Anthropocene” to define the
newest geological epoch. 7 Those who brought the term into common
use over the past twenty years or so explain the need for the new
word; “[h]uman activities have become so pervasive and profound
that they rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing the Earth
into planetary terra incognita. The Earth is rapidly moving into a
less biologically diverse, less forested, much warmer, and probably
wetter and stormier state.”8 As Rosina Birnbaum reported from her
scientific perch:
Humans are changing the Earth’s climate. The physics behind this
statement is not only well-understood, but has stood the test of time,
dating back to the 19th century, when Svante Arrhenius projected
that adding carbon dioxide (CO2) to the atmosphere through

6. See Lisa V. Alexander, Simon K. Allen, Nathaniel L. Bindoff, FancoisMarie Breon, John A. Church, Ulrich Cubasch, Seita Emoris, Piers Forster,
Pierre Friedllingstein, Nathan Gillett, Jonathan M. Gregor, Dennis L.
Hartmann, Eystein Jansen, Ben Kirtman, Reto Knutti, Krishna Kumar
Kanikincharla, Peter Lemke, Jochem Marotzke, Valerie Massonp-Delmotte ,
Gerald A. Meehl, Igor I. Makhov, Shilong Piao, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Qin
Dahe, Venkatachalam Ramaswamy, David Randall, Monika Rhein, Maisa
Rojas, Christopher Sabine, Drew Shindell, Thomas F. Stocker, Lynne D. Talley,
David G. Vaughn & Shang-Ping Xie, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis, Summary for Policymakers, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (2013), www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_ bro
chure_en.pdf (noting that the available scientific evidence indicates that
average temperature is rising and that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
are the dominant cause of global warming).
7. Joseph Stromberg, What is the Anthropocene and Are We in It?,
SMITHSONIAN MAG, (Jan. 2013), www.smithsonianmag.com/science -nature /
what-is-the-anthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414/?no-ist.
8. Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen & John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are
Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?, 36 AMBIO 614 (2007);
see also Ian Angus, When Did the Anthropocene Begin . . . and Why Does it
Matter?, 67 Monthly Review 1 (Sept. 1, 2015), http://monthlyreview.org/2015/09/
01/when-did-the-anthropocene-beginand-why-does-it-matter/ (explaining why
the word is more than a buzzword and why study of it is important to survival
of humans).
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anthropogenic, or human-caused sources, such as burning carbonbased coal, oil and gas, would increase the temperature of the planet.
Over one hundred years later, Arrhenius’s initial projections still hold
true.9

Because human use of energy is the cause of climate change,
proposals to remedy this have ranged from producing and using
“clean energy,”10 to plugging leaks in current oil and natural gas
systems, 11 to imposing an obligation on the fossil fuel energy
industry to restore a viable climate system, 12 to recognizing a duty
of federal agencies to implement a science-based recovery plan
under the public trust doctrine, 13 to ultimately reducing human
consumption of energy on an individual basis as well as globally. 14

9. Rosina Birnbaum, An Essay Adapted from a Presentation Entitled,
“Adaptation to Climate Change,” 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV . 487 (2013); See also
Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View
from the Future, 142 DAEDALUS 40–58 (2013) (criticizing those who question
climate change caused by human action in this work of science fiction set in
2093 where the growing tendency to ignore information and the view that all
human problems including climate change can be dealt with by markets, rather
than government intervention, is explored).
10. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing renewables and nuclear) and
Part I.C (describing unconventional fracking of natural gas).
11. See David McCabe, Waste Not: Common Sense Ways to Reduce Methane
Pollution form the Oil and Natural Gas Industry , CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE (Nov.
2014), http://catf.us/resources/publications/view/205 (showing how EPA can cut
climate warming methane pollution in half).
12. See Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery
Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate
System, 45 ENVNTL. L. 259 (2015) (describing litigation that aims to impose
costs of climate change on the fossil fuel industry); see also Mary Christin a
Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation: Defining Sovereign Obligations in Climate
Recovery, Fletcher Forum of World Aff. (Mar, 27, 2014), www.fletcherforum.
org/2014/03/27/wood (developing an argument that puts responsibility on
government to promote climate recovery).
13. See Alec L. v. McCarthy, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12867 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (holding however that the public trust doctrine
is a matter of state law and does not support federal question jurisdictio n
because the doctrine does not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States); see also Tim Kline, Alec L. and Federal Atmospheric Trust Litigation:
Conceptual and Political Gains Amidst Legal Defeat?, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 529
(2015), www.scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/elq/vol42/iss2/17 (discussing recent
law suits that argue the public trust doctrine requires states and federal
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions).
14. But see, e.g., Energy Efficiency Upgrades Cost Double the Projected
Benefits, Study: Additional Policy Solutions Needed to Confront Climate
Change, ENERGY POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (June 23,
2015), http://news.uchicago .edu /article/2015/06/23/energy-efficien cy-u pgr a d
es-cost-double-projected-benefits (reporting an economics study on Meredith
Fowlie, Michael Greenstone & Catherine D. Wolfram, Do Energy Efficiency
Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program ,
Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No.
2621817, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2621817).
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Reducing use of energy is part of the mitigation that is necessary
for sustainability. 15

B. Renewable Energy, In The Form Of Wind, Solar,
Hydraulic And Waves Promise To Substitute For
Fossil Fuels and To Reduce Significantly The
Carbon Emissions Responsible For Climate Change
John M. Golden and Hannah J. Wiseman argue that the
innovation in nonconventional natural gas, creating the “Fracking
Revolution,” can be used to facilitate production of sufficient energy
via renewables. 16 Many disagree, and maintain that the currently
available renewable energy sources are insufficient to substitute for
fossil fuels to meet world needs, and may never be able to do so. A
variety of problems with the U.S. energy industry cause these
doubts. These problems range from the fact that in the U.S., energy
is owned and distributed via a market, but in many other nations
there is government ownership of energy, to the reduction in the
cost of natural gas, often because of new fracking methods of
production, that reduce incentives for renewables. 17 For example,

15. See, e.g., Peter C. Frumhoff, James J. McCarthy, Jerry M. Melillo ,
Susanne C. Moser & Donald J. Wuebbles, Confronting Climate Change in the
U.S. Northeast, NORTHEAST CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT (July 2007),
www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warm ing/pd
f/confronting-climate-change-in-the-u-s-northeast.pdf
(warning
that
“Mitigation (in the form of emissions reductions) and adaptation are essential
and complementary strategies for addressing global warming”). President
Barack Obama, in August 2015, issued requirements to reduce use of energy.
Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions to Bring Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency to Households across the Country , THE WHITE
HOUSE (Aug. 24, 2015), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/24/factsheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-bring-renewable-energy;
Contra, Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Live with the Trickster: Narrating
Climate Change and the Value of Resilience Thinking, PACE ENVTL L. REV .
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2716895 (challenging the idea
that sustainability is possible and arguing that adaptation to assure resilience
is needed now and going forward to deal with climate change ).
16. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale
Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L. J. 955, 1031-1037 (2015)
(discussing how lessons from innovation in the fracking industry can support
development of renewables in US and internationally; they compare air rights
for wind and solar energy with underground rights needed for fracking); see also
Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change
Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy
Projects, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101 (2012).
17. See Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building OffRamps on the Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV . 325, 347 (reporting
that some see cheap natural gas will reduce investment in renewables but
adopting the model proposed by Rocky Mt. Institute RMI which “emphasize s
energy efficiency and a tempered rise in natural gas (requiring a third less
natural gas than current levels) coupled with a strong renewables portfolio”).
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recent discussions of such problems have focused on development of
distributed solar energy, such as solar installations on residential
and business rooftops, where capturing solar energy from individual
users’ rooftops competes with the established utilities. 18 The lack of
comprehensive and accurate energy consumption data itself may
delay the establishment of realistic energy efficiency goals which
are so important to the real estate industry, as well as in adequate
planning for the transition from fossil fuels to renewables, which is
the generally accepted goal to limit the disasters of climate
change. 19
Optimists report recent studies showing that renewable energy
sources may be sufficient to support energy needs at least in the
future. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris
during talks of commitments to switch from fossil fuels to
renewables, Uruguay reported it had slashed its carbon footprint in
less than 10 years by using the diverse energy mix of renewables. 20
On December 16, 2015, San Diego announced that it would be allrenewable by 2035.21 A study by scientists at Stanford University
provides a roadmap22 whereby the U.S. “could become 80% reliant
on clean, renewable energy by 2030, with a full transition achieved
by 2050.”23 Professor Mark Jacobson, who led the Stanford team,
commented about the reality that such plans will work, said:
18. See, e.g., Michael Pappas, Defining Power Property Expectations, 45
ENVTL. L. REP. 10542 (2015),http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.e du/cgi /
viewcontent.cgi?article=2558&context=fac_pubs (discussing how shift from
voluntary incentive based efforts to mandatory government measures may
“raise objections about interference with property expectations”); see also Troy
A. Rule, Unnatural Monopolies: Why Utilities Don’t Belong in Rooftop Solar
Markets, IDAHO L. REV . (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=257254 7
(arguing that allowing regulated utilities to compete with the rooftop solar
industry will lead to inefficiencies and stifled innovation in developing
renewable energy).
19. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Energy Consumption Data:
The Key to Improved Energy Efficiency, 6 San Diego Journal of Climate and
Energy Law 69 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602974.
20. Jonathan Watts, Uruguay Makes Dramatic Shift to Nearly 95%
Electricity from Clean Energy, THE G UARDIAN
(Dec. 3, 2015),
www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/03/uruguay-makes-dramaticshift-to-nearly-95-clean-energy.
21. Matt Richtel, San Diego Vows to Move Entirely to Renewable Energy in
20 Years, New York Times (Dec. 16, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/12
/16/science/san-diego-vows-to-move-entirely-to-renewable-energy-in20-years.
html.
22. Mark Z. Jacobson, Mark A. Delucchi, Guillaume Bazouin, Zack A. F.
Bauer, Christa C. Heavey, Emma Fisher, Sean B. Morris, Diniana J. Y.
Piekutowski, Taylor A. Vencill & Tim W. Yeskoo, 100% Clean and Renewable
Wind, Water, and Sunlight (WWS) All Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50
United States, ENERGY ENVTL. SCI ., 2015, 8, 2093 (May 27, 2015),
https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/USStatesWWS.pdf.
23. Chris Wood, Study Shows How the US Could Achieve 100 Percent
Renewable Energy by 2050, G IZMAG (June 9, 2015), www.gizmag.com/united states-renewable-energy-2050/37938/.

2015] Fracking the Unconventional Energy Response to Climate Ch ange

457

[w]hen you account for the health and climate costs-as well as the
rising price of fossil fuels- wind, water and solar are half the cost of
conventional systems …A conversion of this scale would also create
jobs, stabilize fuel prices, reduce pollution-related health problems
and eliminate emissions from the United States. There is very little
downside to a conversion, at least based on this science. 24

Nevertheless, the prices to users of energy is based upon the
vagaries of a speculative market which means that in 2016, we will
witness significant declines in prices for heating energy and
gasoline for vehicles and electricity. Merely looking at prices to
consumers, however, is not adequate to compare total costs.
Questions about what to do during the transition period before
reliance on renewables is total and whether there are any
intermediate energies that have a lower impact on the climate have
developed with the quick, strong development of nonconventional
gas from shale through fracking. Natural gas, including fracked
natural gas, is cleaner than coal used for generating electricity and
it is a cleaner fuel to power cars, trucks and other motor vehicles
than gasoline and diesel fuel. And, it should be noted, that for many,
the unspoken goal still is to “allow Americans to continue
consuming energy, guilt-free, at the highest rates in the world.” 25
Whether production of renewable energy will be sufficient to avoid
disaster or whether it can respond adequately to increasing demand
for energy as the world demands per capita levels comparable to the
US remain open questions.

C. Fracturing (Fracking) of Natural Gas Is Now
Recognized by Some as a Transition, or “Bridge,” to
Renewables.
The process of fracking for natural gas is considered to be a
“game changer” that will provide the foundation fuel for the
future, 26 in the form of a cleaner alternative fossil fuel that produces
fewer emissions than coal or oil, 27 that provides energy
24. Id. (quoting Stanford Professor Mark Z. Jacobson and the study
discussed, supra note 22).
25. See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A
Development Lens for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance , 87 TEMP.
L. REV . 229, 236 (2015) (warning that relying on fracking could leave us much
worse off).
26. Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building OffRamps on the Shale Gas Superhighway , 49 Idaho L. Rev. 325, 346 (2013)
(discussing Natural Gas as a Game Changer, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2012);
www.onlinewsj.com/article0/SB100014240527023046404577299682719190);
See also Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES . 1337, 1346 (2013) (describing the economics of gas
from fracking compared to petroleum).
27. See Joel Minor, Completing the Bridge to Nowhere: Prioritizing Oil and
Gas Emissions Regulations in Western States, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 87–90
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independence to US, that is more economical than renewables, and
that can serve as a transition to obtaining such quantities of energy
from renewables that is necessary to reduce the carbon emissions in
the air.
Shalanda Helen Baker provides a fracking primer.28 She
explains how the fracking process produces the natural gas. She
describes fracturing, or “fracking” the commonly used term for the
activity, as involving “the injection of a combination of water,
chemicals and sand into the earth to release natural gas. . . . The
gas is found in geologically complex, nonconventional reservoirs
such as tight (low-permeability) sands, gas-bearing shales and
coalbeds.”29 The process involves drills running vertically for
several thousands of feet (while in conventional gas well
development the drill bores straight down into the earth into a
reservoir of oil or natural gas). With this approach, multiple wells
can be drilled from a single pad. Once the drilling is finished, a
cocktail of chemicals and sand is pumped with water under high
pressure. This pushes through perforations in the horizontal well
bore, fracturing or breaking the shale rock and releasing the natural
gas. 30 Then, the fracking fluid, known as “flowback,” returns to the
surface, and allegedly causes other problems. Fracking in the
context of business operations is discussed later. 31
Some support fracking as a way to provide energy for the
transition from fossil fuels to renewables. It is seen as having
environmental benefits. Burning natural gas produces much less

(2015), https://journals.law.stanford.e du/sites/defau lt/f iles/stanford-enviro n m e
ntal-law-journal-selj/print/2015/04/minor_article.pdf
(discussing conflicting
research on the issue of whether fracking is cleaner than other fossil fuels).
Whether unconventional gas is more dangerous than conventional natural gas
is not clear from standpoint of methane. Id.
28. Baker, supra note 25, at 254.
29. Id. at 254 (quoting Kathryn J. Brasier et al., Residents’ Perceptions of
community and Environmental Impacts from Development of Natural Gas in the
Marcellus Shale: A Comparison of Pennsylvania and New York Cases , 26 J.
RURAL SOC. SCI . 32, 33, n.1 (2011), www.ag.auburn.edu/auxiliary/srsa/page s /
Articles/JRSS%202011%2026/1/JRSS%202011%2026%201%2032-61.pdf).
30. Id. at 254 (citing Nancy D. Perkins, The Fracturing of Place: The
Regulation of Marcellus Shale Development and the Subordination of Local
Experience, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV . 44, 48-49 (2012)); see also Patrick H.
Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses to
a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV . 321 (2015) (comparing the standard
model for drilling natural gas with the new paradigm/new model in great
detail); see T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A. 3d 261, 264 n.1 (Pa.
2012) (providing a description that reflects an understanding of science and
engineering concepts by the judiciary).
31. See infra Part II.A for description of fracking in the context of the
business operations timeline. See also David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A
Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assu rance Bonds,
Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing , 99
IOWA L. REV . 1523 (2014) (presenting a market approach to regulating energy
instead of or along with government regulation).
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carbon emissions than oil or coal. Alongside the strong developm ent
of the fracking industry, the use of coal, the primary source of
energy in the U.S., finally, in 2012, became about equal with natural
gas. Also in 2012, carbon dioxide emissions, the cause of climate
change, were at their lowest level since 1992. 32 While the reduced
emissions receive the most attention, others argue that shale gas
means reduced prices, which should benefit the national economy. 33
Combined with cleaner energy, the human condition could be
improved worldwide. 34 Shale could also help the nation reduce
reliance on imports from other countries. Shalanda Helen Baker
sees fracking as a transition that will “reduce America’s dependence
on foreign oil, provide a ‘cleaner’ energy future by reducing our
dependence on carbon-intensive coals, keep energy costs low, and
also bring desperately needed financial resources to cash-strapped
regions.”35 David B Spence looks at fracking in comparison with
conventional drilling and finds an economic advantage. The “shale
gas boom has brought dramatic changes in the relative profitability
of producing natural gas” in comparison with conventional
drilling. 36
But others, including Robert W. Howarth of Cornell, conclude
that research shows fracking to be much more of a problem. 37 He
concludes that shale gas has a larger carbon footprint than coal and
oil when the full lifecycle of the gas production is considered. They
worry that the perceived benefits are not permanent and that there
are dangers associated with fracking that challenge its long-term
sustainability. Criticism of fracking has been based upon a variety

32. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV . 141, 150, n.36 (2013) (citing U.S.
Energy-Related CO[2] Emissions in Early 2012 Lowest Since 1992, U.S. Energy
Inform. Admin. (Aug. 1, 2012), www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=735 0) .
33. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, President Obama Gets It: Fracking is
Awesome, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:32 PM), www.forbes.com/sites
/christopherhelman/2013/02/12/president-obam a-gets-it-fracking-isawesome/#5416f5123bf1 (suggesting that thanks to fracking consumers pay
lower gas prices, saving consumers $100 billion a year, etc.).
34. John C. Dernbach & Marianne Tyrrell, Federal Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Laws, The Law of Clean Energy: Efficiency and Renewables 25, 26
(Michael Gerrard ed., 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684201.
35. See Baker, supra note 25, at 234-236 (reporting the hope associated with
more natural gas produced by fracking).
36. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage v.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV . 141, 170 (2013).
37. Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge to Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the
Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural Gas, Energy Sci, & Eng’r (2014),
www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/publications/Howarth_2014_ESE_methane_emi
ssions.pdf (concluding that shale gas has a larger carbon footprint than coal and
oil when the full lifecycle of gas production is considered).
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of environmental consequences38 including earthquakes,39 the huge
amounts of water used in the process, 40 water pollution, 41 and
fugitive emissions of methane that may be far greater than for
conventional gas. 42
Finally, as we evaluate the climate change issues, we must
keep in mind the importance of timetables. Lowering the level of
carbon emissions is key to preventing a rise in temperatures of more
than 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century which is the
acceptable goal. How we do this involves not only choices among
known sources of energy but the timing of implementation of such
choices. For example, the transition time away from a carbon
intensive source like coal to a lower level one like natural gas has
been estimated at more than a century! 43 The International Energy
Administration (IEA) estimates that if all that is done is to
substitute gas for coal, the probable temperature rise would be
greater than 3.5 degrees Celsius, well above the 2-degree target 44
because burning natural gas still causes emissions of carbon
dioxide. Likewise, the concern with natural gas is timing and scale
of the transition to non-fossil fuel. To meet the goal of preventing a
rise in temperatures, renewables must make up at least 43% of
global energy by 2030 and 77% by 2050. 45

38. See generally Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal
Landscape of “Fracking”: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing
Technique is Its Biggest Hurdle, 17 TEX. REV . LAW & POLICY 239, 243-254 (2013)
(discussing fracking issues as hurdles to greater use of hydraulic fracking).
39. Id. at 253 (pointing out that it is probably the disposal of drilling wastes,
rather than the drilling itself, causing the seismic activity).
40. See, e.g., Rhonda G. Jolley, Like Grandma Said, “Oil and Water Don’t
Mix,” BRANSCOMB PC (May 9, 2014), www.branscombpc.com/like-grandmasaid-oil-and-water-dont-mix/ (discussing the dramatic change in water use for
fracking as compared with conventional oil and gas drilling).
41. See Baker, supra note 25, at 254 (describing two recent films that have
pointed out the dangers: Gasland and Promised Land).
42. Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro, Anthony Ingraffea, Methane and the
Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations: A letter,
CLIMATIC CHANGE (Mar. 2011), www.acsf.cornell.edu/Assets/ACSF/docs/
attachments/Howarth-EtAl-2011.pdf.
43. Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building offRamps on the Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV . 325, 343, n.143 (2013)
(quoting tech guru Nathan Myrvold and climate scientist Ken Caldeira on this
point).
44. Id. at 341 (quoting Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas: World Energy
Outlook Special Report on Unconventional Gas, International Energy Agency,
91–92 (2012), www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrle s/
WEO2012_GoldenRulesReport.pdf).
45. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Renewable Energy Sources
and Climate Change Mitigation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (2012), http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRRE N
_Full_Report.pdf.
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D. Questioning if Fracking Is the Bridge to
Renewables46
David B. Spence points out that “[p]roponents of wind-powered
and nuclear energy contend that inexpensive natural gas has
dramatically slowed development of these cleaner energy
resources…[and] optimism [in nuclear energy] has waned as
investors worried about the ability of nuclear power to compete with
cheap natural gas fired electricity.”47 By the start of 2016 the
dramatic drop in price of fossil energy was already clear. 48 A topic
heading in a recent article warns: “the Gas Boom Threatens to
undercut Deployment of Renewables and lock in dangerous levels of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions.”49 That renewables like solar energy
are relatively new industries with untested business models,
unanticipated regulatory shifts and the very low cost of natural gas
means that, “Losses Pile Up for Solar Companies, and Future may
be Stormy.”50 Yet, Amory Lovins and Jon Creyts of the Rocky
Mountain Institute suggest that natural gas is not really that cheap
after all. The costs of insuring against price volatility plus other
factors make gas closer, in cost, to solar and wind- that produce no
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). 51 Recognition of the externalized
costs will lead to the transition to renewables. Goldman Sachs
published its own predictions on “The Future of Clean Energy- the
Low Carbon Economy”52 just before the Paris Climate Change
talks. 53 Its perspective of the market for LED lightbulbs and
46. See generally Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far:
Building Off-Ramps on the Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV . 325
(2013) (warning that increased reliance on natural gas from fracking is likely to
undercut efforts to develop renewables).
47. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV . 141, 169-170 (2013).
48. John Ydstie, Drop in Oil Prices Complicates Effort to Combat Climate
Change, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016), www.npr.org/2016/01/28/464664794/drop-in-o i lprices-complicates-effort-to-combat-climate-change.
49. Parenteau, supra note 46, at 342.
50. Diane Cardwell & Julie Creswell, Looking for Silver Linings, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb 11, 2016) at B1.
51. Amory B. Lovins & John Creyts, Hot Air About Cheap Natural Gas,
Rocky
Mountain
Inst.
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://blog.rmi.org/blo g_
hot_air_about_cheap_natural _gas; see also Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro,
Anthony Ingraffea, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas
from Shale Formations: A letter, CLIMATIC CHANGE (March 2011),
www.acsf.cornell.edu/Assets/ACSF/docs/attachmen ts/Howarth-EtAl-2011.pdf
(questioning whether fracking is really less emissions producing than other
fossil fuels).
52. Goldman Sachs, The Future of Clean Energy, The Low Carbon Economy
(Dec. 16, 2015), www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/report-the-low carbon-economy.html.
53. In December 2015, Paris hosted a climate conference in which over 195
countries signed the Paris Agreement, a “bridge between today’s policies and
climate-neutrality before the end of the century.” The Agreement creates legal
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hybrid/electric automobiles is the basis for expecting increased
development of solar energy and onshore wind energy between 2015
and 2020 at a greater amount than US shale oil production did from
2010 to 2015. 54
The debate about the impact of fracking on climate is ongoing
and evolving. While early on it had been seen as a means for
meeting our needs to reduce emissions, 55 Michael Levi reports a
quick turn against shale gas by environmental groups, starting in
2010, to such an extent that by summer 2015 the Environmental
Defense Fund stood alone in seeing shale gas as part of the solution
to climate change. 56 Levi seems to see fracking as part of a broad
energy policy where the result is those using coal would turn to
natural gas and those using natural gas would turn to renewables. 57
Still, Parenteau and Barnes warn that natural gas may be a “bridge
too far for a stable climate change.” 58 Here, it is both the choices
about how fracking is used and what timetable sets up
implementation that may make the difference between impeding
renewables and complementing them to meet carbon reduction
goals.

obligations to reduce emissions for these countries. See European Commission,
Paris Agreement (April 21, 2016), http://ec.europa.edu/clima/polic ie s
/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm (providing the text of the
document).
54. See Goldman Sachs, The Future of Clean Energy The Low Carbon
Economy (Dec. 16, 2015), www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/reportthe-low-carbon-economy.html (using LED lightbulbs as the reason to expect
increasing development of renewable energy).
55. See Michael Levi, Fracking and the Climate Debate, DEMOCRACY J. (July
6, 2015), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/fracking-an d-the-clim ate debate/ (discussing the widespread agreement in 2009 of groups as diverse as
the Sierra Club, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Joe Romm of the Center for American
Progress and President Barack Obama who was seen as calling fracking the
most obvious first step towards saving our planet).
56. Id.; see also Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal
Landscape of “Fracking”: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing
Technique Is Its Biggest Hurdle, 17 TEX. REV . LAW & POL. 239, 256 (describing
key stakeholders in the national discussion, including the environmental groups
that are less enthusiastic than a few years ago).
57. See Joe Nocera, Opinion Pages: Shale Gas and Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/opinion/joe -nocera-shale gas-and-climate-change.html?_r=0 (reviewing Michael Levi, Fracking and the
Climate Debate, DEMOCRACY J. (July 6, 2015) and concluding that
environmentalists should rethink their opposition to fracking).
58. Parenteau, supra note 46, at 342.
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II. THE BUSINESS OF FRACKING HAS BEEN A RECENT
SUCCESS STORY THAT REQUIRES MULTIFACETED
RESPONSE TO CONTROL DOWNSIDES AND RISKS
A. The Fracking Business
The comparison of fracking with the standard model of oil and
gas exploration that began with the first oil well near Titusville,
Pennsylvania in 1859 suggests why fracking is characterized as a
“new model” or even a “new paradigm.”59 Responding to the common
law “rule of capture,”60 a standard developer recovers only the oil
located directly below the surface at a certain depth. This approach
allows a draining of oil “from eighty acres or more, while a vertically
completed gas well can efficiently drain 800 acres or more.” 61 Thus,
the rule of capture encouraged dense drilling with “too many wells,
with wells too close together.”62 As with other activities involving
real property, traditional oil and gas drilling required governmental
land use regulation, mainly at the state and local level. 63
The new model uses horizontal lateral drilling that drain at the
surface only a few hundred feet around the borehole but that extend
over a mile underground. Courts have defined fracking as: “[A]
method used to stimulate production of a well. A specially blended
liquid is pumped down the well and into a formation under pressure
high enough to cause the formation to crack open, forming passages
through which oil or gas can flow into the wellbore.” 64 Because water
is not compressible and shale is not permeable, pressurized water
breaks down the rock allowing oil and gas to flow up to the surface.
This method has allowed developers to recover oil and gas from
shale – a result not possible or commercially feasible under the
standard methods. 65 Fracking plus horizontal drilling has greatly
increased the amount of oil and natural gas available for use in the
US and for export. 66
59. See Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and
Administrative Responses to a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV . 321
(2015) (comparing the standard model for drilling natural gas with the new
paradigm/new model for drilling natural gas by fracking).
60. See infra Part III.H (primer on acquiring interests in real estate
sufficient for fracking natural gas).
61. Martin, supra note 59, at 323.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 264 n.1 (Pa. 2012).
65. Martin, supra note 59, at 326. The common law rule of trespass means
that the driller must get the permission (or a legal right) to extend under the
land of owners beyond the boring area. Id. Holdouts make the fracking method
economically or physically impossible; compulsory pooling rules offset this
limitation of common law trespass. Id.
66. See Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal Landscape of
“Fracking”: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing Technique Is Its Biggest
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Commercial hydraulic fracking of oil wells goes back to 1949, 67
though widespread use did not begin until the 1980’s with greatly
increased production since 2005, coinciding with a federal policy
that put fracking beyond the regulations on oil and gas – the
“Halliburton” exception. 68 William E. Hefley and Shaun M. Seydor
of the University of Pittsburg Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of
Business provide critical information on the impact of drilling and
extracting shale gas by using a Marcellus shale well located in
Southwestern Pennsylvania. 69 Their report emphasizes the “direct
economic impact rather than just focusing on the perceived benefits
and impacts affecting the region.” 70 The Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility and the Investor Environmental Health
Network published its article, Extracting the Facts: An Investor
Guide to Disclosing Risks from Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, to
provide investors with “assurance that company managers are
reducing business risks by addressing operational hazards and are
capturing the genuine, measurable business rewards flowing from
environmental management practices that have the potential to
lower costs, increase profits and enhance community acceptance. ” 71
If the natural gas produced by the fracking industry is to have
an appropriate role in meeting energy needs, appreciating both the
potentially great benefits, as well as the likely harms, is critical to
its expansion in the timeframe of reducing Greenhouse gas (GMG)
emissions by 2050 and beyond.

Hurdle, 17 TEX. REV . LAW & POL. 239 (2013) (reporting the predictions of
International Energy Agency that US will surpass Arabia as largest oil
producer and will be nearly energy independent by 2035); see also Shalanda
Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A Development Lens for
Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMPLE L. REV . 229, 254
(featuring a fracking primer which describes the fracking process).
67. See Shooters - A “Fracking” History, AM . O IL & G AS HIST. SOC’Y ,
http://aoghs.org/technology/hydraulic-fracturing/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016)
(providing an excellent history of the fracking method) (cited in Martin, What
the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses to a New
Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV . 321, 323-324).
68. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, § 322-323
(2005). The Bill exempts certain fluids used in fracking from regulations, and
has been referred to as the “Halliburton Loophole.” See infra note 75-76
(discussing this exemption in great detail).
69. See William E. Hefley & Shaun M. Seydor, The Economic Impact of the
Value Chain of a Marcellus Shale Well, (University of Pittsburgh Pitt Business
Working Paper, August 30, 2011), www.business.pitt.edu/faculty/pape rs
/PittMarcellusShaleEconomics2011.pdf (emphasizing the economic perspective
in their report).
70. Id.
71. Richard A. Liroff, Extracting the Facts: An Investor Guide to Disclosing
Risks from Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, INVESTOR ENVT’L HEALT H
NETWORK (Dec. 2011), http://iehn.org/publications.reports.frackguidance.ph p.
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B. The Fracking Business is Heavily Supported by
Governments in Spite of the Downsides: Government
Support and Lack of Consistent Government
Regulation.
1.

Government Direct Financial Support

Fracking has benefitted from government support by way of
publicly funded research, tax relief, regulatory exemptions and
other relief. 72 Previous tax credits for unconventional gas under the
Section 29 tax credit for gas drilled between 1980 and 1992 (later
extended until 2002) generated tax savings totaling nearly $10
billion for fracking operators. 73 This economic benefit is credited as
being as large as direct monetary contributions by the federal
government. 74 Additionally, there were a variety of “lenient rules
regarding the recognition, timing, character, and calculation of
taxable profits [that] create[d] large [effective] subsidies for
taxpayers engaged in”75 oil and gas production. 76
2.

Exemptions From Federal Environmental Regulation

The Halliburton Loophole, or Halliburton Exceptions,
benefitted the oil and gas industry greatly. 77 That industry,
72. See John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution:
Shale Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy , 64 EMORY L. J. 955, 974-983
(2015) (providing the history of government providing infrastructure includin g
pipelines and “pipeline neutrality” and reforming gas markets that spurred on
the nonconventional natural gas production).
73. Id. at 989.
74. Id.
75. John Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal
Tax Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV .
323, 324 (2011).
76. See Jean L. Bertrand & Lindsey N. Berg, MCLE Self-Study Article:
Fracking:
Expected Lawsuits,
State
Bar
of
California
(2013),
www.schiffhardin.com/Templates/media/files/Other%20PDFs/Fracking-Expected-Lawsuits---California-Real-Property- and-Environmental-Law-News--J--Bertrand-and-L--Berg---Fall-2013.pdf
(originally
published
in
Environmental Law News & California Real Property Law Journal, State Bar
of California (2013)) (reporting on a study by University of Southern California
scientists that the positives in creating 500,000 jobs and over “$25.6 billion in
state and local tax revenue in 2020 alone.”); see also Fracturing in California,
WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2013, 6:57 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788 7
324767004578488821344316236.
77. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322–23, 119 Stat. 594,
694 (2005) (creating the “Halliburton Loophole” which exempts certain fluids
for natural gas from the Safe Water Drinking Act and reduces the reporting
requirements for oil and gas companies). See also Environmental Integrity
Project, Fracking’s Toxic Loophole (Oct. 22, 2014), http://environmental
integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/FRACK INGS-TOX IS-LOOPHOLE.pdf
(“because of a gap in the Safe Drinking Water act, companies are allowed to
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including fracking, succeeded in exempting the industry from key
federal laws. Thus, compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act
and the otherwise applicable hazardous waste disposal regulations
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, the Emergency Planning and Community Right–to–
know Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act is not mandated. 78
The impact of the Halliburton Loophole to real estate will be
examined in Part IV, infra. Moreover, there is no federal law
requiring the disclosure of the composition of fracking fluids which
arguably is a water pollutant. 79

C. The Shale Gas Boom Brings Suggestions for Reform
of the Industry
Joshua P. Fershee uses fracking in West Virginia as a case
study in the Boom that accompanies discovery of energy sources as
it did the Gold Rush. He reviews the positive benefits as well as the
negative impacts. 80 It is the shale gas boom 81 and the fracking
business that Golden & Wiseman use as a case study in innovative
policy. 82 They summarize their analysis of the innovation, pointing
out that a “wide array of actors beyond George Mitchell, a wide
variety of technologies and innovations, moderate use of patents,
mixed practices of secrecy and information sharing, vital roles for
private property rights in minerals and land, and a long history of
government research support, tax benefits, and regulatory and tax
exemptions” tell the story. 83 Communities and private actors that
inject other petroleum products (beyond diesel) without a permit.”)
78. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (b)(2)(A) (1976);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1980); Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(A) (1986); and Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629 (1976). See also Adam Vann, Brandon J. Murrill & Mary
Tiemann, Cong. Research Serv., R43152, Hydraulic Fracturing: Selected Legal
Issues 1, 5-8, 9-13, 20-22, 24 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43152.p df
(discussing all of the mentioned acts).
79. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV . 431, 450 (2013).
80. Joshua P. Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from the
Hydraulic Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 19 TEXAS
WESLEYAN L. REV . 23, 27-30 (2012) (providing the data to support this Boom
analysis); see infra Part IV.B (discussing three categories of risks associated
with fracking that have implications for real estate).
81. See, e.g., The Economics of Shale Oil: Saudi America; The Benefits of
Shale Oil are Bigger than Many Americans Realise, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 15,
2014),
www.economist.com/news/united-states/21596553-benefits-sh a le
(indicating how widespread and pervasive the excitement and enthusiasm for
the Boom has been).
82. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale
Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L. J. 955 (2015).
83. Id. at 1037-1038.
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are involved with the business of fracking experience the benefits
without experiencing all the costs. 84 So, while the authors conclude
that fracking may be a bridge to renewables, they warn that, “In a
post- Great Recession world highly concerned with promoting
economic growth,” appropriate regulation of both the extraction
process and use of the nonconventional natural gas product will be
necessary. 85
It is this business perspective that signals both the importance
of real property to the fracking industry (and thereby to climate
change risks) and to consideration of ways to handle those risks.86
Dana and Wiseman compare the production of energy by fracking
to the Industrial Revolution. 87 For example, they suggest that like
the industrial revolution, fracking presents opportunities for the
creation of great wealth with strong risks of damages to the country
and the planet from both an environmental and public health
standpoint. 88 As they recognize the need for regulation of the
fracking business/industry as a way to be more forward looking
than we have been in the past, Dana & Wiseman suggest insurance
and assurance bonds as market devices that will mitigate harm and
provide funds to remediate damage that could not be avoided. 89
Shalanda Helen Baker uses a development lens to argue that
only thinking about the sources of government regulation and its
features is not the best way to approach the fracking business. 90 She
compares fracking to the seemingly unrelated businesses of
securitizing and global marketing of subprime residential
mortgages that led to the 2008 financial crisis, 91 and of deep-sea
drilling for oil that led to the BP oil spill in 2010, which showed the
world the serious economic damage that a single blow-out could
produce. 92 All three are modern examples of economic developm ent
84. Id. at 998.
85. Id. at 966.
86. See NAOMI K LEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS . THE
CLIMATE , (2014) (arguing that climate change generally is the result of
capitalism, not carbon, implying that careful consideration of the market forces
and proper limits on their power are needed). See also infra Part IV (providing
a comprehensive discussion of the impact of fracking on the commercial real
estate industry).
87. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating
the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and
Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV . 1523, 1526 (2014).
88. Id. (discussing their view that much of modern environmental law has
been dealing with cleaning up water and the soil contaminated by the industrial
revolution and decades of unregulated coal mining).
89. Id. at 1532-33.
90. See Baker, supra note 25, at 269 (criticizing the current debate focusing
on the “federalism binary”).
91. Id. at 245-247.
92. Id. at 247–48, n.93; see also Report: Gulf of Mexico Permanent
Deepwater Structures, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (last
accessed Feb. 1, 2016 at 9:44AM), www.data.bsee.gov/homepg/data_cente r
/other/tables/dpstruct.asp (reporting permanent production platforms in the
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initiatives that respond to economic needs of the moment.
Securitized mortgages developed as a way to provide opportunities
for all Americans to own their housing. Deep-oil drilling used new
technology to produce oil and gas from areas not previously used for
production. During the current U.S. “moment” that views economic
growth as critical to deal with underlying “extremes: extrem e
poverty, extreme gaps in wealth, extreme challenges to food
production, extreme variability with the ecosystem, and extrem e
civil unrest,”93 fracking takes advantage of the ability to produce a
cleaner form of energy than coal and oil, to provide jobs in areas
where economic downturns made that prospect attractive, and to
provide energy independence. 94 However, like securitization and
deep-sea drilling before, fracking threatens worse problems than
the economic advantages it promises.
In what Baker terms the “U.S. development moment” (2008 2015), those three contemporary methods of economic developm ent
“appear to be happening haphazardly, disconnectedly, and in
isolation.”95 Thus, banks made loans to borrowers who were
unlikely to be able to pay them off. Combining subprime mortgages,
characterized by adjustable interest rates that are likely to spike
soon after they are made, with securitization meant that no one had
“skin” in the game if the loans went into default. The exemption of
these securities from ordinary regulation 96 and the unknown fraud
of American ratings agencies meant that investors around the globe
could not make meaningful evaluations of this investment product.
The focus and beneficial goals of bringing more Americans into the
“ownership society” covered up the unappreciated risks to investors.
And, the resulting mortgage defaults on both subprime and then
prime mortgage loans has meant the loss of homeownership and
economic devastation for many Americans. Likewise, with the BP
Amoco spill, the deep-sea drilling business used technology that was

Gulf of Mexico).
93. See Baker, supra note 25, at 238.
94. Richard Martin, America’s Energy Job Machine is Heating Up , FORTUNE
(April 12, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/04/12/americas-energy-job-machine- isheating-up (characterizing deep sea drilling and fracking to be “Just the elixir
the U.S. economy needs”); but see John Burnett, Excitement Over Mexico’s Shale
Fizzles as Reality
Sets In, NPR (March 16, 2015,
3:23PM) ,
www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/16/393334733/excitement-overmexicos-shale-play-fizzles-as-reality-se ts-in (describing the quick turnaround
in attitude regarding fracking in Mexico once the above ground complication s
like water scarcity and lack of pipeline infrastructure became apparent).
95. See Baker, supra note 25 at 244.
96. See Celeste Hammond & Ilaria Landini, The Global Subprime Crisis as
Explained by the Contrast between American Contracts Law and Civil Law
Countries’ Laws, Practices, and Expectations in Real Estate Transactions: How
the Lack of Informed Consent and the Absence of Civil Law Notary in the United
States Contributed to the Global Crisis in Subprime Mortgage Investments , 11
J. INT’L BUS . & L. 133 (2013) (explaining that the Securities and Exchange
Commission does not regulate mortgage backed securities).
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untested and not subject to real oversight. There was no real
regulation of that technology because the industry controlled the
regulators in all meaningful ways. 97 Similarly, the fracking
industry shares with these examples the fact that activities by
private actors work with an inconsistent patchwork of regulation,
which subjects the economy to a systemic risk. 98
All three of these examples exhibit what Baker terms
“hybridity” in their development. Novel technology - financial
technology in the case of the mortgages and engineering technology
in the deep-sea oil drilling and in fracking - took advantage of three
characteristics of what Baker terms, “hybridity.” 99 Hybridity means
that the development approach is not easily regulated, engages a
public good and creates system wide risks. All of these businesses
were quick to develop without consistent government regulation. All
involved a public good (financial markets, ecosystem of the Gulf
waters, and natural resources). All created a systemic economic
risk. 100
Focusing on the hydraulic fracking business, there definitely is
a public good or asset that is engaged as a necessary component of
the business. In addition to the natural gas resources, many of
which are privately owned in the U.S., in contrast to other countries
where they are publicly owned, the public goods of land and water
supplies affected are public goods. The helter-skelter regulation is
reflected in the industry led exemption of fracking from key federal
laws to protect the environment. 101 The so called “Halliburton
Loophole”102 combined with “substantial regulatory gaps and
opacity concerning the chemicals used” 103 and the “mash-up of
inconsistent regulatory regimes”104 has motivated the industry to
work very quickly to get local community approval of activities in
hopes of avoiding future state and/or federal restrictions and
requirements. The industry also tries to effect state law by arguing
and lobbying that federal regulation (where enforcement might be
97. See Baker, supra note 25, at 248.
98. See Golden & Wiseman, supra note 16 at 1037 (noting the private actors,
wide variety of technologies, secrecy and information sharing, private property
rights, and a “long history of government research support, tax benefits, and
regulatory and tax exemptions” are at the base of the business and its
problems).
99. See Baker, supra note 25 at 245-246 (clarifying the term as referring to
an extreme approach to development utilized with little ove rsight or
regulation).
100. See infra Part IV focusing on how the hybridity of fracking affects the
commercial real estate industry).
101. Id. at 256 (for a detailed list of those statutes).
102. See Editorial: The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2009),
www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.htm l (exempting fracking from
federal regulation); see also Baker, 87 TEMP. L. REV . 229, 257.
103. See Baker, supra note 25 at 257 (noting that the chemicals used in
hydraulic fracking also are not regulated or even disclosed).
104. Id.
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more likely to occur) is not needed. The systemic environmental risk
of fracking activity includes use of water at a rate far beyond
natural replenishment and water pollution. 105 Systemic social risk
includes the transformation of rural communities, especially the
boomtown phenomena. 106 Additionally, Baker points to the
economic systemic risk in fracking of obtaining leases on land
already subject to mortgages, other security interests and private
regulation. Her concern is beyond the lenders themselves to the
financial markets to which lenders likely would spread that risk.107
Finally, Baker argues that once we understand hybridity in a
particular approach to development we appreciate why government
regulation alone is not sufficient to protect the society. She urges
the development of an “interruption” in the hybridity by using
transactional devices where the fracking business will take on more
of the risks. The fracking business, like the securitization of
mortgages and deep-sea oil drilling in this current moment of
development, should internalize more of the risks and therefore
keep risks lower. 108 The industry should recalibrate the sharing of
both risk and benefit through public private partnerships and use
of transactional and ownership structures. Moreover, such an
interruption would reduce the scale of fracking projects in ways that
can reduce the systemic risks of fracking.
Because of the potential for profits and meeting other social
and economic goals already discussed, many argue for the
enhancement of this industry. Yet, even proponents like Dernbach
and Levi see need for public concern and control. Dana and
Wiseman call for insurance and assurance bonds rather than just
regulation to control risks of fracking. 109 Bonds provide money to
pay for loses resulting from fracking that is allowed.

D. Suggestions for Better Approaches for the Fracking
Process
Dick Roddewig and Jim Hughes go beyond transactional
devices and regulation to deal with risks and challenges of fracking
in their symposium article. 110 They herald the great increase of oil
105. Id. at 263; see infra Part IV.B(1) (explaining fracking’s risk of pollutin g
water in the area).
106. Id. at 266; see infra Part IV.B(2) (discussing the social and community
harms because of fracking).
107. Id. at 267; see also, infra Part IV.B(3) (describing economic risks the
fracking industry places on both individuals and communities).
108. Id. at 277-281.
109. See Golden & Wiseman, supra note 16.
110. Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes, Underbalanced Drilling:
Can It Solve the Economic, Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems,
Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV . 511 (2015) (suggesting a
new technology called underbalance drilling (UBD) that would enhance
production of nonconventional shale gas without the risks and legal challenges
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and natural gas from fracking that makes “the United States the
largest combined producer of oil and gas in the world, having
surpassed Russia in 2012 and in 2014 surpassing even Saudi Arabia
in the production of oil alone.”111 With one of the authors having
significant experience as a fracker, the article provides both a
description of the boom of the industry,112 as well as the main
environmental problems. 113 The article offers an alternative to the
conventional “overbalanced” drilling which has led to extrem e
government regulation including even outright bans in New
York. 114 Focusing on new interests in underbalanced drilling (UBD)
as a possible solution to environmental and regulatory takings
issues in both Texas and Colorado, the authors present an
introduction to the process of UBD, describe how UBD eliminates
the environmental problems associated with fracking, compare the
economics of UBD with overbalanced fracking and discuss whether
state and local governments have the legal authority to require
underbalanced drilling rather than fracking. 115 Their ten-point
agenda to get recognition of UBD as the solution for the issues
facing the U.S. oil and gas production industry is innovation that
must be considered now. 116

III. PRIMER ON A CQUIRING & SELLING AND PRESERVING &
PROTECTING I NTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE FOR HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR NATURAL GAS
A. Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing has increased the nation’s supplies of
natural gas but has also raised issues, which real estate attorneys
need to know more about. This is especially true for those practicing
in regions in which, before the recent boom in fracking, natural gas
was not being produced. These are the attorneys whose clients are
of fracking).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *3–4.
113. Id. at *5–7.
114. Underbalanced drilling (USD) is offered as an alternative to the
traditional overbalanced drilling because underbalanced drilling “reduces
formation damage” and requires less underground pressure for drilling.
Ramona M. Graves, Drilling Operations: An Overview, ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
4-1 2001 (2015). UBD is considered advantageous for two reasons: (1)
maximized hydrocarbon recovery, and (2) minimized pressure -related drillin g
problems. See Society of Petroleum Engineers, Underbalanced Drilling (UBD),
Petrowiki (June 26, 2015 3:29PM), http://petrowiki.org/Underbalanced_drill in g
(UBD) (providing an engineer’s perspective on the fracking process).
115. See Roddewig & Hughes, supra note 110, at 26–44 (providing an
excellent analysis of the argument favoring underbalanced drilling over
conventional overbalanced drilling).
116. Id. at *45–48.
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now interested in acquiring for investment or in selling lands that
can be used by fracking developers or whose clients may own or
possess land affected by fracking. Thanks to the rise of this new
industry it is again necessary for real estate attorneys to remember
legal concepts they covered in law school or even to learn about them
for the first time.
The increased interest in fracking is a result of stories about
the profits that have been realized by those who invested in real
estate that could be fracked. 117 Many real estate investors have seen
their investments multiplied through the advancement and
innovation of hydraulic fracturing. However, without real estate,
getting in a position to profit from the fracking boom is not possible.
Golden and Wiseman characterized real estate as a complementary
asset in the hydraulic fracturing business. They point out the
relatively less important role of intellectual property rights than
one might expect with such an innovative product. 118 Thus, entry
into this new aspect of the energy industry requires the acquisition
of interests in real estate. The ability to obtain interests in real
estate contributed to the development of shale gas industry and
enabled early investors who bought interests at low prices to reap
the benefits as shale gas fields were developed and started to
produce natural gas. 119 Even now, “speculating firms” can obtain an
interest in property and treat the property as a complementary
asset through the property value increase resulting from demand. 120
To reap these profits from the sale of natural gas produced by
hydraulic fracturing investors need to obtain rights in real estate,
which will enable them to initiate the fracking process. To do this,
they need attorneys able to advise on how to acquire the necessary
rights and, after such rights are acquired, how to protect those
rights. This knowledge is equally important for those attorneys
whose clients currently own real estate that potentially could be
used for fracking. Unfortunately, there is not one set of rules that
attorneys representing developers and/or landowners need to
follow. This primer will show that this is yet another area of law
where the applicable rights and restrictions arise primarily under
state law. Good advice in Pennsylvania may not be good advice in
Ohio. The difficulty is knowing which rights to acquire, how they
117. Golden & Wiseman, supra note 16, at 1000 (discussing Alan Krupnick,
Zhongmin Wang & Yushuang Wang, Sector Effects of the Shale Gas Revolution
in the United States, Resources for the Future, 36–39 (2013), www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-13-21.pdf).
118. Id.
119. Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, A Retrospective Review of Shale Gas
Development in the United States: What Led to the Boom?, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE (April 2013), www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-13-12.pdf.
120. Id. at 30. “Speculating firms” are those “entrepreneurial natural gas
firms” seeking to benefit from the shale play. Id. By leasing land at low prices,
firms learned that “it is through land acquisition, not innovations per se, that
early movers obtained their financial returns for their early investments.” Id.
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are acquired, and how they are protected because these rights are
regulated on a state-to-state basis.
Hydraulic fracturing can occur on: “federal, Native American,
state, and private lands,” which has the geology that indicates that
if fracked, will produce natural gas. Geology determines if lands can
be fracked. Thus, if the geology is “right,” fracking “can occur
virtually anywhere, absent an explicit regulation” which prohibits
fracking. 121 This primer is designed to provide an introduction to or
a revisiting of some of the existing legal concepts that can help
practitioners gain an understanding of an evolving area of the law.
It can help them to ask the right questions and do research about
the law in their jurisdictions so that they can properly advise
clients. This primer will focus only on private lands leaving it to
others to consider the matter of fracking on federal, Native
American and state lands. 122 In addition, since states, not the
federal government, establish the laws which establish ownership
rights in land and mineral rights therein, this primer will consider
only state laws and regulations. 123
The dramatic and widespread use of fracking to produce
natural gas is a recent development. Fracking was not something
that was contemplated when the legal doctrines that this primer
will discuss were developed. Thus when looking at old deeds, leases
and other instruments granting interests in real estate, it is
important to ask: do provisions in this instrument prohibit or
prevent the use of the land for hydraulic fracturing? This is an
important question to ask because until very recently there was no
likelihood that anyone involved in real estate transactions would
have considered fractured natural gas as a possible benefit of the
land, certainly not in the expansive way that the business has
developed. Standard clauses, or even definitions, in deeds and
contracts for giving a property right may not work for land used for
fracking. Mikal C. Watts and Emily C. Jeffcott review the rules that
are being developed on even the basic question of whether shale gas

121. See Baker, supra note 25, at 256 (pointing to privately owned land,
public land owned by local, state and federal government, and Native American
land).
122. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Federal Laws, Regulations, and Programs
Affecting Local Land use Decision Making: Hydraulic Fracturing, SV003 ALIABA 409 (August 2013) (describing federal law affecting local decisions about
fracking).
123. Alex Ritchie, Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute, 60 RMMLF PROC 11, 11.03[2][b][ii], n.215 (2014) (stating
“The Supreme Court resorts to state law to define the range of interests that
qualify for protection as ‘property’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments”) (relying on Bd. of Regents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972); and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011–13 (1984)).
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is included in the classification of minerals or even all minerals. 124
It depends.
Some courts have determined that old decisions regarding coal
rights do not apply to fracking. For example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted the principle that reserving “minerals” in a
deed does not include the right to frack natural gas, because “the
word ‘minerals’ was not intended by parties” to include natural gas
or oil. 125 And because states vary greatly in treatment of mineral
rights, States may define “minerals” more broadly than
Pennsylvania, states may restrict landowners from fully exercising
mineral rights, and states may regulate the severing of the mineral
estate from the surface estate. Therefore, state treatment of mineral
rights, including fracking, varies greatly.

B. Old Principles Predicated on Production of Coal
May No Longer Apply
The common law principle of Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos, meaning “[T]o whomsoever the soil belongs, he
owns also to the sky and to the depths,” is somewhat misleading
now, because landowners can sever surface rights from mineral
rights. 126 In early coal cases, the Supreme Court shed light on
treatment of mineral rights. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,127
the Supreme Court adopted the principle that “the right to coal
consists in the right to mine it,” which gives rise to the principle
that mineral rights include rights to access the minerals. 128 In
Texaco v. Short, the Supreme Court upheld state dormant mineral
statutes. In that case, Indiana’s statute, which allowed mineral
rights to revert to the surface owner when the owner of the severed
mineral interest fails to use the minerals, was validated. 129 Yet and
more relevant for our analysis, the Supreme Court recognized a
difference between coal and coalbed methane gas in Amoco v.
Southern Ute, where an Indian tribe asserted that a reservation of
“coal” included the gas. 130 The Court relied on coal’s property as a

124. Mikal C. Watts & Emily C. Jeffcott, Does He Who Owns the “Minerals”
Own the Shale Gas? A Guide to Shale Mineral Classification , 8 TEX. J. O IL &
ENERGY L. 27 (2012-2013).
125. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 620 Pa. 1, 11 (Pa. 2013).
See generally Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving
Perennial Problems in the Shale Era, 62 K AN. L. REV . 97, 136, n.228 (2013)
(focusing on how wording in old laws and legal documents complicates rule
making about fracking).
126. See 1 Coke on Littleton § 1(4) (1628).
127. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
128. Id. at 414 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co.,
256 Pa. 328, 330 (1917)).
129. Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
130. Amoco v. Southern Ute, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
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“solid rock substance” when asserting that when “coal” is reserved,
the gas is not included in the reservation. 131
This distinction is relevant and significant when extending
legal principles from coal cases to oil and gas cases, because coal is
a hard mineral, unlike oil and gas, which are fugacious, and capable
of moving from one tract of land to another. Some suggest that oil
and gas may even be “liken[ed] . . . to wild animals” and the ferae
naturae concept. 132 Oil and gas are not solid or “hard” minerals
because they are found in fluid states, so, in “some ways” it is “easier
to handle than solid minerals.” 133 Unlike mining, oil and gas can be
accessed when fractures in rock formations “[open] pathways for oil
or gas to flow to the well.”134 Thus, the common law for coal may not
apply to fracked natural gas and even if it did, the significance of
that rule may be reduced for coal because of the reduced amounts
being mined today. In the words of Michael Levi, “natural gas has
killed new coal-fired power,” and the “brewing” natural gas
revolution has led to a severe decline in the demand for coal. 135
Shale gas presents possible reconsideration of traditional legal
principles applied to subsurface minerals.
1.

Splitting Interests in Real Estate to Facilitate Fracking

There are two particular interests to keep track of: surface
rights and mineral rights. 136 It is possible for one person to own the
surface estate, and another person to own the mineral estate such
that there is a “split estate.” Where a landowner has a unified estate
(also referred to as a full estate or fee simple), the landowner will
own the surface estate and the mineral estate, and the “right to
explore for and produce [the] minerals” in the mineral estate. 137
Unencumbered fee simple ownership, in property law, gives an
owner the right to use, to exclude, and to transfer. 138 A landowner

131. Id. at 875.
132. J. Thomas Lane, Oil and Gas, WEST VIRGINIA YOUNG LAWYERS
SECTION
(2000),
www.wvyounglawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
chapter26.pdf.
133. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 364,
n.8 (2014).
134. Id. at 365.
135. Michael Levi, Fracking and the Climate Debate, DEMOCRACY (2015),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/frack ing-and- the-climate-debate/.
136. See generally Christopher S. Kulander, Common Law Aspects of Shale
Oil and Gas Development, 49 IDAHO L. REV . 367, 369–77 (2013) (providing basic
property law analysis).
137. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 365,
n.20 (2014); see also John Dernbach, Can Shale Gas Help Accelerate the
Transition to Sustainability?, ENVTL. MAG. (Jan. 2015) (explaining the basic
property rules).
138. Clifford A. Lipscomb, Yongsheng Wang & Sarah J. Kilpatrick ,
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with a unified estate may be able to sever the mineral estate from
the surface estate. Landowners may do this by lease, by sale, or by
contracts that offer limited rights (like exploration or limited
production). And, those rights may be impaired by way of contract
or agreement. 139
While the sale of subsurface rights creates a “split estate, ”
leasing subsurface rights only creates an encumbrance, a leasehold
interest, on the overall property. 140 These encumbrances and sales
both tend to impact the value of property. Generally, the more rights
a landowner has, the greater the property value. 141 Changes to
subsurface ownership “have a direct and measurable impact on both
fee simple values as well as the value of the surface rights taken
alone.”142
Oil and gas leases provide a lessee with the opportunity to drill
on a property for a primary term, which is a set number of years,
and the option for a secondary term, which arises if the property is
producing minerals. In exchange, a lessor will receive royalties from
the resulting mineral production. A mineral lease is merely an
interest in the property’s mineral estate, and the rights required to
exercise that interest. 143
A lease requires at least an identification of the parties, a
granting clause, a description of premises to be leased, term of the
lease, and consideration. 144 Consideration usually includes payment
by royalties, delay payment clauses, regular payments by schedule,
and bonuses. 145 Lessees will negotiate to maximize profit and
minimize costs, while lessors seek large royalty fractions, high
bonuses, and short primary terms for agreements. 146 After a lessor
verifies unencumbered ownership of oil and gas, lessors try to
maximize the value of their subsurface minerals. Maximized value

Unconventional Shale Gas Development and Real Estate Valuation Issues , THE
REVIEW OF REGIONAL STUDIES 42(2): 161, 164 (2012).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 163–64.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See generally Jared B. Fish, The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing: A
Behavioral Analysis of Landowner Decision-Making, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 219
(2011-2012) (arguing that asymmetric information encourages landowners to
lease shale minerals even though there are hazards).
144. Andrew Graham, The Basics of the Oil and Gas Lease, Steptoe &
Johnson, http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/92955 (last accessed Dec. 31, 2015);
See also Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving Forward
After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV . 615 (2011)
(reviewing litigation arising from fracking leases in Marcellus region).
145. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS , O IL AND
G AS LAW, § 3-6 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015).
146. John B. McFarland, Checklist for Negotiating an Oil and Gas Lease,
G RAVES ,
DOUGHERTY,
HEARON
& MOODY,
P.C.,
www.gdhm.com
/images/pdf/jbm-ogleasechecklist.pdf.
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is accomplished through greater royalties, larger bonuses, and
shorter agreement terms. 147
Delay rental payment clauses are problematic in oil and gas
leases. Delay rental payments are owed when a lessee seeks to delay
the start of drilling. Lessor is concerned because delays may extend
so long that they impede prompt development of mineral rights and
associated economic benefits to lessor. 148 Although the lessee
compensates the lessor for the postponed drilling in the form of
delay rental payments, the lessor may lose the opportunity to make
alternative agreements where a substitute lessee is prepared to
begin drilling and generating revenue much more quickly. New
York allows delay rental payments to extend an oil and gas lease,
while Ohio “provides that a lease terminates at the end of the
primary term when no well is producing, even if delay rentals
continue.”149
In response to possible delays in starting to drill, lessors
include termination clauses in lease agreements for situations when
a well fails to produce so that the lessee can protect his ability to
enter alternate agreements and ensure profits from the subsurface
minerals. Parties involved in real estate transactions for mineral
rights should also be aware of force majeure clauses, pooling and
unitization clauses, and assignment clauses that may enable or
restrict transfers of rights. 150
John McFarland suggests a number of variables that impact
valuation in a lease. 151 First, if production in the area has already
begun, lease terms are likely to reflect that industry’s success.
Competition for leases also drives up bonuses and royalties. A lessor
with more property is likely to get better lease terms. A lessor
willing to take risks may be able to negotiate terms. Parties should
be aware of whether neighboring tracts are engaged in drilling.
Lessors should also realize that property value for the fee simple
might drop significantly as a result of oil and gas development on
the property or on surrounding properties. 152 The industry practice
for royalties is at a fraction of production, so the lessor gets a benefit
from successful production. 153

147. Id.
148. Aaron Richardson, Hite v. Falcon Partners: A Model Rule for Marcellus
and Utica Shale States Precluding the Use of Delay Rental Payments to Extend
the Primary Term in an Oil and Gas Lease, 46 AKRON L. REV . 1133 (2013).
149. Id.
150. See infra Part.IV (where the implications of fracking for real estate,
real estate law and real estate practice are developed).
151. Id.
152. Clifford A. Lipscomb, Yongsheng Wang & Sarah J. Kilpatrick ,
Unconventional Shale Gas Development and Real Estate Valuation Issues , THE
REVIEW OF REGIONAL STUDIES 42(2): 161-175 (2012).
153. Andrew Graham, The Basics of the Oil and Gas Lease, STEPTOE &
JOHNSON (last accessed Dec. 31, 2015), http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/downlo ad
/92955.
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In a third option, a landowner may offer to a party “limited
rights,” giving the party, for example, an opportunity to enter the
property, explore, conduct tests, and assess mineral viability
without the risk of long-term payments to a lessor. As part of such
transactions, the grantee of such limited rights may also acquire an
option to buy subsurface rights or to lease them if the investigation
shows likelihood of success. Both oil and gas leases and agreements
for limited rights to subsurface minerals are bound by principles of
contract law. 154
While sales are “forever” transactions (except when a state has
a dormant mineral act), 155 leases and agreements for limited rights
may be much shorter. But, leases and agreements may actually run
for a very long time. In T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, the
court upheld a lease for rights to drilling and operating for oil and
gas for two years, to be extended “as long… as oil or gas is produced
in paying quantities, or operations for oil or gas are being conducted
thereon,” that continued around 80 years. 156 The court identified
that the habendum clause of the lease, specifically the words “in
paying quantities,” is “regarded as for the benefit of the lessee, as a
lessee would not want to be obligated to pay rent for premises which
have ceased to be productive, or for which the operating expenses
exceed the income.”157
2.

Need for Certainty of Title

Certainty of ownership of the fee simple/unified estate and, if
severed, the ownership of the resulting mineral and surface rights
is critical to advise real estate clients. The principle of nemo dat
quod non habet, from property and contract law, tells us that
landowners cannot divest rights that they do not have. 158 There are
two principle reasons why a landowner would not have full
ownership of the property. First, the subsurface (mineral) estate is
federally owned. Thus, in few states, like Montana, the subsurface
and mineral estate rights are federally owned, and a landowner only
has private rights in the surface. 159 Approximately 11.7 million

154. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 208 (2012).
155. See discussion, infra, notes 171 through 190, on dormant mineral
legislation.
156. T.W. Phillips, 615 Pa. at 204.
157. Id. at 210.
158. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (6th ed. 1991) (“Nemo dat qui non
habet” means “He who hath not cannot give”).
159. Stock Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §299(a) (2000); see also Do you
really OWN the minerals under your land?, MONTANA STATE O FFICE BLM,
www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/mt/blm_programs/m ining.Par.72349.File.dat/
minerals.pdf (last accessed Feb. 8, 2016) (addressing the creation of the Stock
Raising Homestead Act as a way for the government to hold an interest in
minerals for fueling the community while the landowner could use the surface
for ranching).
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acres of private land in the Rocky Mountain West are “split
estate.”160 Additionally, in these states, the government is also
entitled to use the surface as is “reasonably necessary” to develop
subsurface assets. 161 In such situations, landowners or those
seeking to acquire ownership in the land and their attorneys should
contact the local Bureau of Land Management office to assess their
rights.
The second reason why a landowner would not have a unified
estate is that a previous fee simple holder split the estate and those
subsurface rights already have been divested, or a previous fee
simple holder retained the subsurface estate for himself when
transferring title to a grantee.
Yet, title searches and title insurance may not provide needed
answers to the questions of who owns the land and which type of
ownership rights different owners have. A buyer may not know, at
the time of purchase, that their purchase does not include the
subsurface rights. While buyers should conduct title searches as
part of due diligence, they may not know what they should be
looking for or how to discover interests in subsurface property
because title searches will not reveal unrecorded oil and gas leases.
Buyers should fully investigate title through whatever means
possible. In the American system, characterized by limited reliance
on recordation, rather than title registration, if a buyer has
constructive notice of a transfer, but fails to properly investigate the
full extent of the transfer, the buyer is bound by the terms of the
transfer. 162 Generally, though, lack of recording makes a
contractual obligation or a lease of mineral rights unenforceable
against a good faith purchaser but this assumes that the purchaser
had no constructive notice. 163
Because it is not always obvious when there is a split estate,
mineral rights owners should also take affirmative steps to protect
their interests by recordation. For example, Ohio and North
Carolina both mandate that oil or gas leases constitute title
160. Do you really OWN the minerals under your land?, MONTANA STATE
O FFICE BLM www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm /mt/blm_programs/m ining.Par.
72349.File.dat/minerals.pdf (last accessed Feb. 8, 2016).
161. Oil & Gas: Caution, NORTHERN PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL (Winter
2014),
www.northernplains.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NEWBearto o th
FrontPostalPatronMailer_20 14-2-13_-FNL.pdf.
162. Guerin v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 68 Mont. 365, 368 (1923) (holding
that a buyer had constructive notice of an unrecorded lease because the
unrecorded lease was referenced in a later-recorded option such that the buyer
was charged with all references made in any document in her chain of title and
the buyer had a duty to inquire about rights under the unrecorded lease); see
also Andrew Barksdale, Fracking: Many in NC don’t control rights to gas under
their land, WRAL NEWS , www.wral.com/fracking-many-in-nc-don-t-controlrights-to-gas-under-their-land/13660362/ (June 6, 2014) (describing how
mineral rights, split estates and forced pooling are new concepts to owners in
Sandhills of North Carolina).
163. Id.
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transactions that must be recorded for a mineral rights owner to
preserve rights in the subsurface. 164 Buyers should search recording
offices for full chains of title. 165 However, recording does not usually
require recordation of the full lease. Often a memorandum lease or
part of the lease, which only provides limited information about the
transaction, is legally sufficient. 166 In these situations, buyers must
seek affirmative information such as the complete document for
review as well as representations from their sellers.
Finally, and very significantly, mineral rights are typically
excluded from title insurance. 167 This means that title insurers are
less inclined to fully investigate titles to mineral interests, leaving
interested parties to search for information on their own, which is
costly and time consuming. 168 Landowners should also become
aware of any royalties paid from oil and gas leases. Few courts have
held that royalties from oil and gas leases are “real property” such
that a conveyance of the real estate is a conveyance of the royalty
too, despite the lease being unrecorded. 169
3.

Dormant Mineral Legislation and Reunified Estates
function to reduce the number of owners and to keep title
marketable. 170

Some states have enacted “dormant mineral” legislation to
ensure that the “dormant severed mineral ownership pattern” that
164. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 2015 Ohio LEXIS 2971 (2015);
Oil & Gas Leases in North Carolina: Summary of Landowner and Public
Protections in the Law, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , P.L. 2012
and S.L. 2011-276 (Dec. 20, 2012), www.ncrec.gov/pdfs/OilGasSummaryofLaw
.pdf.
165. Joe Wilson, Title Searches: Proof of mineral rights ownership , G REENE
COUNTY MESSENGER (Nov. 28, 2014), www.heraldstandard.com/gcm/opinio n /
guest_columnists/title-searches-proof-of-mineral-rightsownership/article_adc5b61b-1d11-5c73-b639-a8d33f07a525.h tml.
166. This means that good faith and diligent buyers may be unable to
discover the extent of subsurface rights that are leased to another. See Judon
Fambrough, Hints on Negotiating an Oil & Gas Lease, TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY
REAL ESTATE CENTER (July 2015), https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu /
documents/articles/229.pdf.
167. Jane Easter Bahls, Guide to Home Ownership – Chapter Three:
Defending Your Title, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1999), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrate d/pu bliced/practical/books/home_ow
nership/chapter_3.authcheckdam.pdf.
168. Matt Moberg, The Mystery of Mineral Rights: A Lesson for Lenders,
Porter Wright Banking
& Fin
Law Rep. (March 15, 2013),
www.bankingandfinancelawreport.com/2013/03/articles/real-estate/themystery-of-mineral-rights-a-lesson-for-lenders/.
169. Martin J. McMahon, Oil and Gas Royalty as Real or Personal Property,
56 A.L.R.4TH 539, *39b (discussing Mark v. Bradford, 23 N.W.2d 201 (1946)).
170. Dormant Mineral Legislation mirrors Marketable Title Acts and the
Rule Against Perpetuities in trying to limit the number and kind of interests in
real estate; the goal is to have most land owned in fee simple absolute to meet
the public policy goals of easy buying and selling.
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is “an incurable title disease” is resolved. 171 The “incurable title
disease” arises when an estate is split, but the subsurface estate
owner abandons the property or becomes absent. The legislation is
designed to reunify the estate. A recent count shows dormant
mineral acts in about 21 states including Illinois, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and North Dakota. 172
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed model legislation returning mineral rights to a
surface owner if, after twenty years, the mineral rights owner has
failed to exploit the mineral rights and has received notice of
nonuse. 173 State legislations vary, but typically, failure to use
mineral rights in the requisite term (commonly twenty years) will
result in the rights being deemed “abandoned.” The mineral rights
holder can prevent abandonment through a “savings” event, like
making a recorded transfer of rights, actual production of
subsurface rights, or filing of a claim of interest. 174 In Ohio, a recent
case ruled that a “recorded oil and gas lease” constitutes a savings
event because a lease has an “effect on ownership, possession, and
custody” of property, thereby resolving the incurable title disease. 175
Further, the court ruled that the unrecorded expiration of a
recorded lease does not restart the dormancy clock. 176 The
expiration must be recorded or filed to constitute a savings event
171. Patrick J. Garver & Patricia J. Winmill, Medicine for Ailing Mineral
Titles: An Assessment of the Impact of Adverse Possession, Statutes of
Limitation, and Dormant Mineral Acts, 29 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 7-1 (1983);
see also Michigan Act 42 of 1963: Termination of Oil and Gas Interests on Land
(explaining how basic property concepts like adverse possession and Dormant
Mineral Acts affect ownership of mineral rights).
172. ROBERT J. AALBERTS , REAL ESTATE LAW (Cengage Learning, 9th ed.
2014). See generally Gregory D. Russell and Lauren N. Fromme, Dormant
Mineral Acts: Addressing Severed Mineral Interests in a Fractional World , 33
ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 8, 8.03 (2012), www.emlf.org/clientuploads
/directory/whitepaper/russell_fromme_12.pdf (for a greater discussion of types
of dormant mineral legislation).
173. Dormant Mineral Interests Act, Model Summary , UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION (1986), www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral %
20interests/udmia_final_86.pdf (the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act
was converted to the Model Dormant Mineral Interests Act). The Act was
adopted, in its entirety, by Connecticut, and in part by California, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See also Laura
Lindley, Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Annual
Institute – 2014 Jan (Advanced Mineral Title Examination – Oil & Gas and
Mining), 2014-1 RMMLF PROC 2 (2015).
174. Gregory D. Russell and Lauren N. Fromme, Dormant Mineral Acts:
Addressing Severed Mineral Interests in a Fractional World, 33 ENERGY & MIN.
L. INST. 8, 8.03 (2012), www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepape r/
russell_fromme_12.pdf.
175. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 144 Ohio St. 3d 490 (2015);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.56 (2016).
176. Id.
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such that there is “record notice on the chain of title that the
mineral rights have reverted.”177 Another savings event, the
transfer of mineral rights, will restart the clock and give the bona
fide mineral rights purchaser the specified term to exercise the
newly received mineral rights.178 It should be noted that this only
applies to transfers of mineral rights; the transfer of surface estate
title does not constitute a “savings” event. 179
Generally where states have taken legislative action to deal
with “abandoned” or dormant minerals, three common options are:
(1) mineral rights automatically revert to the surface owner, 180 (2)
mineral rights revert to the surface owner after he gives notice to
the mineral rights owner, 181 or (3) the state creates a trust to hold
mineral rights for the benefit of the mineral rights owner. 182 The
states intend to cure situations where “owners… are unaware of
their rights [or] too remote to care” by imposing dormant mineral
acts that either seek to identify unknown or missing owners, or
declaring the abandonment of mineral interests after a certain
period of time. 183
Dormant mineral legislation has been constitutionally
challenged as “takings” of private property without notice and
compensation, but withstood judicial scrutiny at the United States
Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc. v. Short. 184 In that case, an Indiana
statute provided that a severed mineral interest that goes unused
for 20 years will automatically lapse and revert to the current
surface owner unless the mineral owner acted to protect its
interest. 185 The Supreme Court affirmed the Indiana Supreme
Court, which upheld the statute because an unused mineral interest
is “mischievous and contrary to the economic interests and welfare
of the public… creates uncertainties in title and constitutes an
impediment to the development of the mineral interests.”186
Some states have adopted marketable title statutes, which
generally recognize dormant mineral legislation as an exception to
the claims cut off by a marketable title. 187 Marketable title statutes
177. Id.
178. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.56; Michigan Dormant Minerals Act, MCL
§ 554.291 (2016).
179. Id.
180. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 554.291, Ind. Code §§ 32-23-10-1 through 8
(2016).
181. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.56; Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-108 (2015).
182. Pennsylvania’s act embodies the three options. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 701.1 et seq., the “Dormant Oil and Gas Act,” (effective July 11, 2006).
183. Dormant Minerals Acts and the Marcellus and Utica Shale Plays ,
JONES DAY (April 2013), www.jonesday.com/dormant_minerals_acts/.
184. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 789 (citing Texaco v. Short, 406 N.E.2d at 627).
187. Uniform Marketable Title Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1990), www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/marketable%20title/umta_fin al_90.pdf.
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typically state that if an owner has a clear chain of title for a
specified period, ranging from 20 to 40 years, then the title is clear
of all claims or defects that were recorded before the owner’s root of
title. 188 The Uniform Marketable Title Act does not make an
exception for mineral rights, but provides an optional provision “for
states which choose to exclude mineral rights from the interests cut
off by the Act,” adding that “states which wish to give special
treatment to mineral interests should consider adopting the
Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act.”189

C. Limitations on and Consequences of Severing the
Mineral Estate
A landowner’s ability to sever the mineral estate may be
impaired if he has a mortgage on the property. This restriction
arises because when land is mortgaged, “banks ultimately hold the
risk associated with the mortgage.”190 Because banks and lenders
do not want to take on the risks associated with hydraulic
fracturing, contractual provisions in the mortgage documents may
impair a landowner’s ability to sever a mineral estate. 191 In
contrast, this is not the case in Ohio, where oil and gas leases that
are recorded after a mortgage have a “super priority” over
mortgages!192 The “super priority” will preserve a lease from being
terminated or extinguished in the case of foreclosure, as long as the
lease was recorded after the mortgage and the lease is not in
default. Therefore, a mortgage lender in Ohio must “take special
care to protect its collateral because a foreclosure of a prior
mortgage will not divest a subsequent oil and gas lease.” 193
Oklahoma has created unique legislation for protecting the owners
of oil and gas rights giving oil and gas interest owners a superior
priority over other lienholders and secured creditors. 194 While Ohio
gives priority to the oil and gas lease, Oklahoma gives a priority to
mineral rights owners in produced oil and gas. 195 This puts mineral
rights owners in a position to ensure payment, but it is important
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Baker, supra note 25.
191. Id.
192. Ohio Rev. Code § 1509.31(D) (2016).
193. Steven M. Regan, Client Alert: Oil and Gas Leasing and Development:
A Real Estate Lending Perspective, REED SMITH (Dec. 31, 2012),
www.reedsmith.com/en-US/Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-and-Development-A-RealEstate-Lending-Perspective-12-31-2012/.
194. Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010, 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52,
§ 549.1 cmt. 1 (2010).
195. Sahar Jooshani, There’s a New Act in Town: How the Oklahoma Oil and
Gas Owners' Lien Act of 2010 Strengthens the Position of Oklahoma Interest
Owners, 63 O KLA. L. REV . 133 (2012), www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/
files/files/FACULTY/04%20jooshan i%20note%20blu 2.pdf.
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to note that, in Oklahoma, interest owners will not trump mortgage
lenders. 196
Additionally, there may be consequences when the fee simple
estate is split. A landowner’s rights may be impaired or restricted
by the severing of the mineral estate. First, some states impose
severance taxes. Although there is no federal income tax on
severing, states impose severance taxes “based on the monetary
value of the oil or gas produced” or on the “volume of production. ”
Oklahoma imposes a 2% tax rate on the gross value of oil and gas
production within the first 36 months of production, and a 7% tax
rate for any production thereafter. 197 On the other hand,
Pennsylvania currently has no tax and continues to debate the need
for a severance tax after realizing that other states generate
significant revenue from severance taxes. 198
Second, the mineral estate often becomes the dominant estate,
so the landowner’s surface rights may be subverted. The individual
holding the mineral interest may have a right superior to the
surface right, because the owner of the mineral rights should be able
to access the minerals located sub-surface. When a landowner
divests the subsurface rights by sale or lease, the landowner is
usually offering an implied, or even an express, easement on the
surface of the property. 199 Because “the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it,” most states follow the principle that a mineral
rights owner is entitled to use the surface property to the extent
that it is “reasonably necessary” for the owner to access the mineral
beneath. 200
However, this principle has been challenged with the rise of
horizontal drilling (an important element of hydraulic fracturing).
In conventional vertical drilling a mineral interest owner needed
only the “surface location directly above that targeted location.” 201
A well was placed on the property surface directly above minerals
because that was only way to access minerals. In vertical drilling,

196. Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010, 52 Okla. Stat. tit. 52, §§ 549.112 (2010).
197. 68 Okla. Stat. § 1001 (2014).
198. Jon Hurdle & Reid Frazier, Feds show Pennsylvania gas revenues
sharply lower than other leading producers, NPR STATE IMPACT PENNSYLVANI A
(Aug.
21,
2015
5:17
PM),
https://stateimpact.n pr.o rg
/pennsylvania/2015/08/21/feds-show-pennsylvan ia-gas-revenues-sharplylower-than-other-leading-producers/. For a greater discussion and a state
survey of severance taxes, see Oil & Gas Production Taxes, LexisNexis 50-State
Surveys, Statutes & Regulations (Nov. 2015) (providing a survey of all 50
states).
199. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS , 1-2 O IL AND G AS LAW
§ 218 (2015).
200. Id.
201. Bret Wells, The Dominant Mineral Estate in the Horizontal Well
Context: Time to Extend Moser Horizontally , 53 HOUS . L. REV . 193 (2015).
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the surface estate became subservient to the mineral estate because
of an “implied easement” to the mineral rights owner. 202
With horizontal drilling, a horizontal well often is drilled more
than a mile away from a horizontal drain hole, meaning that a
single well can “produce from multiple different production points
including off-tract production points.”203 Horizontal drilling compels
drilling from a “remote location.” Thus, restrictions on a mineral
rights owner’s ability to use the surface do not mean that the owner
is denied the ability to produce oil and gas. 204 Oil and gas can be
produced from surrounding tracts through the use of a single well
on a single tract. Bret Wells identifies several issues with
traditional property principles that arise with horizontal drilling. 205
For example, a mineral rights owner has an exclusive right to drill
a vertical well on a tract; but, in horizontal drilling, when the well
is placed on a nonproducing tract, the mineral rights owner does not
receive an implied easement and cannot drill a horizontal well
without the surface owner’s consent. 206

D. Consequences of Retaining/Withholding Mineral
Interests
A landowner may choose not to sell or lease rights to minerals.
Landowners are entitled to traditional property causes of action like
trespass, ejectment, compulsory partition, and compensation for
damages. Nevertheless, states have prioritized access to minerals
to such an extent that owners may no longer have those total
property rights. 207 Courts commonly express this public policy
priority by demonstrating distaste for “waste” of minerals, even
expressing that “the public has a sufficient interest in the
preservation of oil and gas from waste to justify legislation upon this
subject.”208
1.

Concurrent ownership of unified estates issues to consider

When a landowner jointly owns a unified estate with another,
one landowner may want to remove minerals, while the other does
not want to allow any subsurface development. Where the owners

202. Id. at 199.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 213.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 219.
207. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 376
(2014).
208. Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 340 (Pa. 1893).
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are joint tenants or tenants in common, each of the co-owners has
an “undivided right to possess the entire estate.” 209
This means in a majority of jurisdictions, “each co-owner could
develop the minerals individually.”210 As co-owners, both are
“owners of the substance of the estate” meaning that each has the
right to “make such reasonable use of the common property as is
necessary to enjoy the benefit and value of such ownership.” 211 Each
co-owner has the “right to develop and operate the common property
for oil and gas” despite the non-consent of other co-owner(s). 212 The
majority rule for development of minerals by concurrent owners
follows from the possibility of mineral drainage by a third party if
each co-owner needed to consent to development of oil. 213 The time
spent getting consent might mean that the value of the
hydrocarbons would be lost to all of the co-owners. Thus, the
majority rule allows each co-owner to develop and to sell oil and gas
without risk of a claim of “conversion” by any other co-owner. 214
However, this principle is limited in two ways: first, a developing
co-owner cannot exclude or oust another co-owner from also
developing on the land; and, second, “the developing co-owner must
account to other co-owners and bears the financial risk” of
development. 215 While co-owners are equally entitled to share in the
property, when one develops without the consent or participation of
another, the risk and costs of developing the property must be
allocated accordingly.
Non-consenting co-owners are not held liable for financial risks
(costs) of developing, or failing to develop, minerals unless they
benefit from a mining partnership in which there is a “community
of losses as well as profits.”216 Non-consenting co-owners are
entitled to “the basis of the value of the minerals taken less the
necessary and reasonable cost of producing and marketing the
same.”217 Non-consenting co-owners may seek an accounting to
determine their “proportionate shares of proceeds.” 218 When there
is no partnership, a non-consenting co-owner is not required to
contribute to expenses. The two general exceptions to this rule are
209. Marla Mansfield, A Tale of Two Owners: Real Property Co-Ownership
and Mineral Developments, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1, 16 (1997),
http://digitalcommons.law.u tulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&contex
t=fac_pub.
210. Id. at 20-19.
211. Id. (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 20-20.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 20-20.
216. Id.
217. Mansfield, supra note 209.
218. Id. Accounting means “an act or a system of making up or settlin g
accounts, consisting of a statement of account with debits and credits arising
from relationship of parties.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (6th ed. 1991); see,
e.g., State ex reI. King v. Harvey, 214 So. 2d 817, 819 (Miss. 1968).
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for: (1) costs of improvements “which were necessary and enhanced
the value of the common property” and (2) when property
development, like fracturing, results in a profit from which
expenses are deducted before the non-consenting co-owner receives
what his allotted amount. 219
2.

Impact of the Rule of Capture on choice not to develop

In addition, sometimes, landowners who have not chosen to
develop their mineral rights or to transfer those rights to others
may be barred from causes of action for subsurface trespass because
of the “rule of capture.” The “deceptively simple” rule of capture, as
Bruce Kramer puts it, comes from the idea that “the owner of a tract
of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells
drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas
migrated from adjoining lands.”220 In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
landowner could not claim subsurface trespass unless he proved
actual injury because the “rule of capture gives a mineral rights
owner title to the oil and gas produced from a lawful well bottom ed
on the property, even if the oil and gas flowed to the well from
beneath another owner’s tract.”221 The court further added that the
“maxim -- cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos –
‘has no place in the modern world.’” 222 The court clarified that
“actionable trespass requires injury, and [Plaintiff’s] only claim of
injury – that [Defendant’s] fracing [sic] operation made it possible
for gas to flow from beneath Share 13 to the Share 12 wells -- is
precluded by the rule of capture.”223
Nevertheless, the rule of capture does not give unlimited
authority to drain minerals from another’s land. Some of the
regulations in place to preserve landowner rights include “well
spacing, proration or allowable regulation, and pooling and
unitization.”224 The rule of capture will not absolve liability for
trespass in situations where: “(1) a person commits a subsurface
trespass by engaging in slant drilling that results in the well
bottoming beneath his neighbor’s property; (2) a person negligently
or intentionally wastes oil or gas or he intentionally interferes with
the ability of someone else to produce oil or gas from a formation,
219. Knight v. Mitchell, 97 Ill. App. 2d 178, 182 (5th Dist. 1968).
220. Bruce Kramer & Owen Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900, n.2 (2005) (citing Robert E. Hardwicke,
The Rule of Capture and its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas , 13 TEX. L.
REV . 391, 393 (1935)).
221. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12–13
(Tex. 2008) (emphasis added).
222. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946)).
223. Id. at 13.
224. Bruce Kramer & Owen Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 904 (2005).
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without benefit to himself; or (3) the rule has been superseded by
conservation statutes and regulations.”225 Inapplicability of the rule
of capture for these situations is explained by the Texas Suprem e
Court in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., stating that “negligent waste
and destruction of petitioners’ gas… was neither a legitimate
drainage of the minerals from beneath their lands nor a lawful or
reasonable appropriation of them.”226 In Texas, the rule of capture
bars recovery on a trespass claim when the defendant “simply
drained gas from neighboring property” but damages may be
available where there is “substantial drainage” and where
“subsurface trespass results in ‘actual injury’ to neighboring
property.”227
3.

Correlative Rights Doctrine

Additionally, the “correlative rights” doctrine may reduce a
landowner’s ability to bring a cause of action against another. The
concept of “correlative rights” refers to the doctrine that landowners
have rights to use “their land with respect to rights of adjoining…
landowners in water or oil.”228 In the mineral context, correlative
rights mean “when multiple tracts of land overlie a common
reservoir of oil or gas, the owners of those separate tracts each have
a right to produce oil or gas from the reservoir through operations
on their own properties, but that each owner’s exercise of his rights
can affect the common reservoir and thereby affect the ability of the
other owners’ to produce oil or gas from the reservoir.”229 Owners
are granted equal opportunities to develop land. “Accordingly, each
owner has certain duties that relate to the reservoir, and the other
owners have rights that arise from that duty.” 230

225. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 367
(2014).
226. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948).
227. Jean L. Bertrand & Lindsey N. Berg, MCLE Self-Study Article:
Fracking: Expected Lawsuits, Schiff Hardin (2013), www.schiffhardin.com/
Templates/media/files/publications/PDF/Fracking-Expected-Lawsuits--California-Real-Property-and-Environmental-Law-News---J--Bertrand-an d-L-Berg---Fall-2013.pdf.
228. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1991), citing Alameda County
Water District v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co. Inc., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1st Dist.
1974).
229. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 369
(2014).
230. Id.; see also Bruce Kramer and Owen Anderson, The Rule of Capture –
An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 930 (2005) (suggesting that a
landowner must look to state case law to understand what rights are available
if another captures oil and gas from the landowner’s property).
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Forced pooling

In thirty-nine states landowners are also restricted in their
ability to avoid gas or oil extraction beneath their property by state
“forced pooling” regulations. 231 Forced pooling, also called
unitization, modifies rules relating to trespass because landowners
who refuse to permit drilling on their property may be required to
comply with unitization orders. 232 Forced pooling “compel[s] holdout
landowners to join gas-leasing agreements when enough of their
neighbors have already signed on.” 233 One example of the law in
action: in Pennsylvania, the forced pooling law allowed Hilcorp, a
drilling company, to drill even when landowners refused to sign
drilling leases. 234 “The specific provisions of the laws vary from state
to state, but drillers are generally allowed to extract minerals from
a large area or ‘pool’--in most states a minimum of 640 acres--if
leases have been negotiated for a certain percentage of that land.” 235
While some view forced pooling as harmful to a landowner’ s
rights from the perspective of the rule of capture, others see forced
pooling as a remedy for a landowner whose minerals are being
“drain[ed] away” by a neighboring well. 236 Tim Carr, a geologist and
professor at West Virginia University, added that “By not signing a
lease, ‘you’re not going to stop a well being drilled. You’re going to
stop yourself from getting money for it.” 237 Additionally, Michigan
follows the rule that even if neighbors receive royalties, a nonconsenting landowner (one who has not granted a lease for mineral
production), will only receive “fair compensation” for minerals.238
Thus, a landowner presented with an oil or gas lease should
consider whether surrounding neighbors received the same lease. If
yes, there is a possibility that the landowner’s minerals will be

231. See generally Benjamin Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems in
Allocation of Production to Owners of Non-Participating Royalty Interests in the
Era of Horizontal Drilling, 44 ST. MARY’S L. J. 771 (2013) (providing a
comprehensive history of the Texas case and predictions of future with
fracking).
232. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 383
(2014).
233. Your Lawn Need Fracking?, NEWSWEEK G LOBAL Vol. 162, Issue 24
(June 20, 2014).
234. Id.
235. Marie C. Baca, Forced Pooling: When Landowners Can’t Say No to
Drilling, PROPUBLICA (May 18, 2011). State survey available: Marie C. Baca,
State Laws Can Compel Landowners to Accept Gas and Oil Drilling ,
PROPUBLICA (May 19, 2011).
236. Id. at 395 (discussing Coastal Oil and Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,
268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008)).
237. Your Lawn Need Fracking?, NEWSWEEK G LOBAL Vol. 162, Issue 24.
238. Curtis Talley, Jr., Compulsory Pooling and the Landowner That Has
Not Signed an Oil and Gas Lease, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION
(March 15, 2013).
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taken under forced pooling law, but the landowner will receive only
a fraction of the profits. Forced pooling regulations have been
upheld for two reasons: (1) they are valid exercises of state police
power because there is a public interest in efficient development of
resources, preventing waste, and equitable sharing of profits, 239 and
(2) there is no taking because nonparticipating owners still have
mineral interests and a right to royalties. 240

E. Private Restrictions and Government Regulations
Impact Mineral Rights Ownership
Private and public restrictions may also impede a mineral
rights owner’s ability to develop their minerals. Private regulations
and public regulations are distinguishable. Private regulations
come from private third parties and independent associations, while
public regulations originate from “federal, state, regional and local
government entities.”241
1.

Private restrictions

Private regulations tend to come in different forms, for
example: mortgage restrictions as mentioned before, homeowner’ s
insurance policy provisions, lease stipulations, and restrictive
covenants benefitting adjacent property. Private insurance
companies can, in effect, impose regulations that government
regulatory agencies are unable to impose often because of political
obstacles. 242 “Standard, non-negotiated, gas leases fail to mention
insurance or indemnification.”243 This means that risk allocation
remains with the landowner, often a homeowner.
For example, homeowner’s insurance “excludes from coverage
the types of hazards associated with unconventional drilling.” 244
Thus, property loss or damage is not covered by common
239. Continental Resources v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D.
1997); Eugene E. Dice, Oil and Gas Forced Pooling Update, PENNSYLVANIA BAR
ASSOCIATION ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER (Mar.
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406901.
240. Marla Mansfield, A Tale of Two Owners: Real Property Co-Ownership
and Mineral Developments, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1, 20-52 (1997),
http://digitalcommons.law.u tulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&contex
t=fac_pub.
241. Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39
HARV . ENVTL. L. REV . 107, 126 (2015).
242. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 87 at 1529.
243. Elisabeth N. Radow, At the Intersection of Wall Street and Main:
Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Residential Property Interests, Risk
Allocation, and Implications for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 77 ALB. L.
REV . 673, 682 (2013).
244. Id. (discussing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Press Release: Nationwide
Statement Regarding Concerns About Hydraulic Fracturing (July 13, 2012),
www.nationwide.com/newsroom/071312-FrackingStatement.jsp).
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homeowner’s insurance and homeowners are left to defend the
claim on their own. 245 Elisabeth Radow advised homeowners with
gas lease prospects to consult counsel and impose the following
requirements on the gas company:
(i) [N]ame the homeowner as an additional named insured on its
general liability policy and self-insure beyond the policy limits; (ii)
pay for homeowner's insurance, regardless of cost, should the
homeowner be denied coverage on his or her own homeowner's policy
as a result of the drilling activity; and (iii) provide for indemnification,
which survives termination of gas drilling operations, for related loss
or property damage.246

In effect, private insurance companies can act as marketregulators of fracking operations by imposing mandatory
insurance. 247 Mandatory insurance has been imposed on nuclear
plants and offshore oil companies. 248 Implementing mandatory
insurance in fracking would require affirmative action from private
companies, and some may be unwilling to take that action.
Lease stipulations are negotiated between the lessors and the
lessees, and may be used to limit drilling on the leased property. 249
During negotiations, landowners can seek terms like location of
wells or drilling activity, requirement for lessee to return surface to
original condition, insurance, and even liquidated damages in the
case of surface harm. Landowners may also want to regulate the
time for drilling and provide for restoration of the surface at the end
of the lease term. In Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, the Texas
Supreme Court held that lessees have no obligation to restore the
surface of property unless it is imposed by “some provision in the
lease or by necessary implication.”250 Although some jurisdictions
recognize an implied duty of surface restoration, not all do. Lessors
should add express clauses creating a duty to restore. 251
Adjacent property landowners often have protectable rights, as
mentioned before, when the rule of capture doesn’t absolve
liability. 252 Those situations include: when a person drills on a slant
such that well bottoms beneath the neighbor’s property, when a
person wastes minerals or interferes, intentionally, with another’ s
ability to produce oil or gas, and when the rule of capture has been
superseded by conservation statutes and regulations. 253 Adjacent
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 87, at 1531.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corporation v. Marathon Oil Co., 152 S.W.2d 711, 724
(Tex. 1941).
250. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1957).
251. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co., 151 S.W.
3d 306, 310-12 (Ark. 2004).
252. Bruce Kramer & Owen Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899 (2005).
253. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
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property owners may sue the drilling permit holder for tort liability
when actions arising out of the use of the permit are tortious. 254 A
landowner’s activities may interfere with the rights of another
landowner if they intrude on an adjacent owner’s ability to access
the minerals below his own surface. Contracts and agreements
between the landowner and the property owner are from where
“private regulations” derive. Hence, agreements between the
landowner with mineral rights and an adjacent landowner function
as private regulation.
2.

Government regulation

Public regulation of mineral drilling and the land used for it
arises from the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
provides that states can exercise police powers to protect “public
health, safety, and welfare.”255 Oil and gas estates are subject to
reasonable regulations pursuant to state police power. 256 The police
power, government land use regulatory authority, and community
rights are generally enough to give authority for local bans,
moratoria, and regulations on fracking. 257 Communities affected by
the fracking boom tend to have “rapid population increase… wide spread housing shortages and skyrocketing inflation… [H]eavy
truck traffic… has taken a great toll on the roads…. Increased
traffic also led to numerous accidents and deaths… and other public
safety concerns.”258 Obviously, not all of the impacts of fracking are
positive, so both frackers and landowners must be aware of
government regulation. Local and state government regulations
that limit fracking operations include zoning laws, moratorium s
and bans on drilling, drilling permit requirements, disclosure laws,
community restrictions against nuisance and for enjoyment, and
regulations tailored for flood-prone regions, water ways, and fireprone regions. 259 State laws on oil and gas development vary
“among formations and by the type of resource being extracted.

is There an Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361, 367
(2014).
254. Dr. Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State
and Federal Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government
Regulation: Examining the Santa Fe County Oil and Gas Plan and Ordinance
as a Model, 44 URB. LAW. 533, 8 (2012) (citing to Bruce M. Kramer, A
Renaissance Year for Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: the Texas Supreme Court , 18
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV . 627, 628 (2012)).
255. Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV . 927, 958 (2015).
256. Tysco Oil Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1935).
257. Outka, supra note 255 at 958.
258. Joshua P. Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from the
Hydraulic Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 12 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV . 23, 26 (2014).
259. Id. at 32.
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Lessons from one state therefore may not fully transfer to other
states.”260
Even with the existence of local and state regulation of
fracking, in many states those regulations do not create separate
rights for neighbors, adjacent property owners, or other third
parties related to the land because generally “operators have no
obligation to consult with residential tenants, neighbors,
agricultural lessees or any other non-owner who could be affected
by the proposed operation.”261 Neighbors may be able to enforce
rights through civil actions, under the common law of torts or
contracts. 262 Requiring advance notice to those close to a proposed
well may become more common as a protection of adjacent property
owners and neighbors. 263
Public regulations have also been imposed to deal with the
common problem of abandonment of wells, which typically results
when wells dry up or oil and gas prices drop up, or the fracking
company becomes unable to afford the cost of the leased land and
files for bankruptcy. When a well is abandoned, the landowner
might desire that the well be plugged and that the surface of land
be cleaned up, both of which can be costly to achieve. 264 If wells are
not plugged, there is a strong chance of groundwater
contamination. 265 When wells are abandoned, states are usually left
with bearing the cost of abandonment. 266 States are regulating well
abandonment more, but there are limitations on regulation -

260. Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas
Development,
Including
Hydraulic
Fracturing
(Jan.
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547 (research funded
by the University of Texas Energy Institute).
261. Katherine Toan, Not Under My Backyard: The Battle Between Colorado
and Local Governments Over Hydraulic Fracturing, 26 COLO. NAT. RES.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV . 1, 66 (2015) (citing to Colo. Code Regs. 404-1:306(g)).
262. Benjamin E. Apple, Mapping Fracking: An Analysis of Law, Power, and
Regional Distribution in the United States, 38 HARV . ENVTL. L. REV . 217, 233
(2014).
263. Lauren Sommer, What California’s New Fracking Rules Would Do (And
Not Do), KQED SCI . (Nov. 15, 2013) (reviewing proposed fracking rules in
California that required that oil well operators give at least 30 days advance
written notice before fracking to landowners and neighbors within 500 feet of
the well), ww2.kqed.org/science/2013/11/15/what-californias-new-frackin g rules-would-do-and-not-do/.
264. Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural
Gas Boom Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013
/12/25/us/state-may-act-to-plug-aban doned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gasboom-ends.html?_r=0; see also, Dimiter Kenarov, Lost: Hunting for
Pennsylvania’s Orphaned and Abandoned Wells, Pulitzer Center (Jan. 31,
2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pennsylvania-aban doned-wells-sh ale gas-oil-horizontal-drilling-hydraulic-fracturing-climate-change .
265. Dan Frosch & Russell Gold, How ‘Orphan’ Wells Leave States Holding
the Cleanup Bag, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015 10:30 PM), www.wsj.com
/articles/how-orphan-wells-leave-states-holding-the-cleanup-bag-1424921403.
266. Id.
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enforcement, especially as new wells continue to be built. 267
Wyoming is setting aside money collected from gas companies as a
part of the permit process to begin plugging wells, “but bonding
often sets aside too little.”268 Assurance bonds may be used to pay
for contamination clean up even in the absence of liability. 269
Wyoming bonds require companies to pay a $75,000 blanket bond
to cover all of the wells they operate – and once a well stops
producing, the operator must pay up to $10/linear foot in bonding to
offset cost of reclamation. 270 Not only are bonds generally
inadequate to cover the cost of plugging, but also some companies
find ways to avoid financial assurance requirements entirely. Then,
landowners may be left with inadequate remedies if a financially
bust company abandons the well and land. 271
3.

Current System: The Absence of Comprehensive
Regulation

Comprehensive regulation of fracking is virtually nonexistent.
There is some federal regulation, some state regulation, and some
local regulation, but some contend that there is a “dearth of a proper
regulatory mechanism.”272 The specific requirements of drilling
activity vary based on where the activity takes place: federal, state,
Native American, or private land. 273 From state to state, there is
significant variation in the reception and treatment of fracking
activity. 274 Some local governments have implemented regulation to
limit fracking operations and fill regulatory vacuums, even as “some
states have taken steps to preempt local authority.” 275 In 2011,
Pennsylvania state legislature passed legislation that required local
land-use ordinances “shall allow for the reasonable development” of
the Marcellus Shale, which preempted certain local ordinances that

267. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 87 at 1526.
268. Frosch & Gold, How ‘Orphan’ Wells Leave States Holding the Cleanup
Bag, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015 10:30PM), www.wsj.com/articles/how-orphanwells-leave-states-holding-the-cleanup-bag-1424921403.
269. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 87, at 1529.
270. Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural
Gas Boom Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12
/25/us/state-may-act-to-plug-abandoned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gas-boomends.html?_r=0.
271. Tony Dutzik, et al., Who Pays the Costs of Fracking?, Environment
America Research & Policy Center (2013), www.environmentamerica.org/
sites/environment/files/reports/Who%20Pays%20the%20Cost%20of%20Frack in
g_vUS%20screen_0.pdf.
272. See Baker, supra note 25, at 255; see also David B. Spence, Federalism,
Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production , 161 U. PA. L.
REV . 431, 434-35 (2013) (complaining about the impact of federalism on the goal
to have comprehensive, uniform regulation of fracking).
273. See Baker, supra note 25, at 256.
274. Id. at 258–59, nn.159–65.
275. Id.
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regulated gas well operations. 276 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
later overturned this provision in the state statute, recognizing that
the intentions of the legislation were good, but the actual legislation
had
“structural
difficulties,”
and
was
“malleable
and
unpredictable.”277 In contrast, a town in New York amended a local
zoning ordinance to “expressly prohibit extraction of oil and gas or
other associated processes,” but the amendment was upheld, as
“state law did not prohibit local zoning laws which prohibit oil and
gas development.”278 The state regulation “could have preempted
local regulation,” but did not in light of the lack of “a clear
expression of preemptive intent.”279 Local regulations generally
address the “secondary” impacts of fracking and may be “much
needed” for a community. 280 “The door is open to complementary
local regulation” to state and federal regulations, as long as local
regulation is not prohibited. 281 Alternatively, in Louisiana and
Ohio, local governments are “largely preempted from regulating.” 282
There is a great debate about state preemption, which has been
addressed by several scholars and practitioners. 283
Some regulations are so detailed that they appear to be de facto
bans on fracking, according to David Spence. However, Hannah
Wiseman argues that, “even these very detailed ordinances could
allow a particularly ambitious operator to attempt to drill and frack
for oil and gas.”284 Regulations are necessary in a world where
bargaining is not costless. “The costs and benefits of fracking are

276. Id.
277. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 698 (Pa. 2013).
278. Kevin J. Lynch, Frackings/Takings, 84 U. CINCINNATI L. REV .
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602516 (discussing Wallach v.
Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201 (N.Y. 2014)).
279. Id.
280. Dr. Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State
and Federal Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government
Regulation: Examining the Santa Fe County Oil and Gas Plan and Ordinance
as a Model, 44 URB. LAW. 533, 7 (2012).
281. Id.
282. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking from the Ground Up , 93
TEX. L. REV . See also 29, 36, nn.50–51 (2015) (offering the reason that local
governments have very little voice on the proper allocation of entitlements).
283. For a greater discussion of state preemption, see Id. at 8. Compare
David L. Callies, Federal Laws, Regulations, and Programs Affecting Local
Land Use Decision Making: Hydraulic Fracturing, SV003 A.L.I.-C.L.E. 409
(2013) which indicates how state law usually, but not always, preempts “local
land use controls.” See also Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking from the
Ground Up, 93 TEX. L. REV . 29 (2015), www.texaslrev.com/wpcontent/uploads/Wiseman-93-SeeAlso.pdf (offering Wiseman’s response to
David Spence and his analysis that is consistent with the Calabresi-Melam e d
economic framework).
284. David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEXAS L.
REV . 351, 352 (2014); Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking from the
Ground Up, 93 TEX. L. REV . See also 29, 36 (2015), www.texaslrev.com/wpcontent/uploads/Wiseman-93-SeeAlso.pdf.
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spread widely . . . but local governments experience concentrated
costs and benefits (particularly costs).”285 Typically, the costs and
benefits of fracking are not fully appreciated by the producers of the
oil and gas. 286 This impacts how governments engage in decision making to regulate or even to prohibit fracking activity. 287 Wiseman
recognizes that more consideration is necessary before creating a
system in which costs match benefits to a party. 288
Finally, fracking regulations have been challenged as “takings”
because owners of oil and gas interests maintain their absolute
right to extract oil and gas without the impact of fracking
regulations. 289 Regulation ranges from moratoriums and outright
prohibitions to zoning regulations to regulations on the technical
process. 290 Regulations have generally been upheld as “necessary”
to protect the public, including a statewide prohibition of fracking
in New York. 291 In Colorado, communities demanded government
regulation after experiencing societal harms and decreasing quality
of life from the encroaching oil and gas community. 292 Such
regulations are intended to curb activity that is “’injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community,’ or when the uses around
the property preclude its use in a certain manner, such as for a
brickyard, or when new circumstances arise making the public
interest be preferred over a private property interest, such as a
disease spreading through trees.”293 Fracking is associated with
several injurious activities having “nuisance-like impacts” such as
“air pollution, water pollution, induced earthquakes, community
impacts of boom town economics, and health impacts such as
increased cancer risk and premature births.” 294 For this reason,
most fracking regulations do not rise to the level of takings. 295
A wrinkle in takings law arises because owners of oil and gas
interests are entitled to make “reasonable use” of the surface of the
property above their oil and gas interest, for example in gaining
access to install a well. This right to “reasonable use” may make the
subsurface interests superior to the surface estate. The right may
deprive the surface owner of some property value. Alternatively, if
285. Spence, supra note 284, at 358-368, 379-383; see also, Wiseman, supra
note 284, at 34-36.
286. Wiseman, supra note 284, at 34, n. 37-38 (“Fracking generates benefits
not fully internalized by producers, such as tax revenues from the influx of wellpaid employees, jobs created in supporting industries outside of the oil and gas
sector, and, perhaps, increased national security. It additionally produces costs
at the state, regional, and national levels also not borne by producers.”)
287. Id. at 44.
288. Id. at 45.
289. Lynch, supra note 278.
290. Id. at 6.
291. Id. at 9.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 40. (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887)).
294. Id. at 40-41.
295. Id.
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the only way to access a subsurface interest is by unreasonable
means, then the oil and gas owner is effectively deprived of the right
to extract minerals. 296 The question of “reasonable use” is based on
the factual circumstances, and is a “principle that might insulate
fracking regulations and bans from takings claims.” 297 Regulations,
in their current state, make property rights less certain, but
market-based regulation may offer stability by placing liability on
the harm-causing parties. 298

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FRACKING FOR COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE
A. Introduction
Fracking has the power to revolutionize commercial real estate
markets. John M. Golden and Hannah J. Wiseman report “a vast
range of straightforward economic benefits” resulting from the
natural gas boom. 299 These include job creation and tax revenues as
well as the reduced price of energy that makes meeting that demand
achievable for more people. 300 Although they recite the “negative
environmental effects,” even those can be reduced especially if
methane leakage from wells, gathering lines and pipelines are
managed and controlled. 301
Case studies, like those reported by Joshua Fershee, reveal
similarities and differences between production of oil and gas
through fracking in North Dakota (oil in Bakken Shale) and West
Virginia (gas in Marcellus Shale). 302 Fershee discusses the oil play

296. Id. at 42.
297. Id.
298. As discussed, market-based regulation may be an alternative to
governmental regulation. Dana and Wiseman have proposed mandatory
insurance and assurance bonds as substitutes for the “current patchwork state”
of regulation. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to
Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain
and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV . 1523, 1529
(2014). The insurance and assurance bonds would create a pool of financial
resources for a community to pull from when dealing with clean up and repair
of an area. Id. Right now, there is uncertainty in who bears the risk of
contamination or damages resulting from fracking, so there are several
insurance coverage issues. Insurance Coverage Issues in Hydraulic Fracturing,
MATTHEW BENDER COMPANY, 2014 EMERGING ISSUES 7295 (2014).
299. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale
Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 966 (2015).
300. Id. at 998, n. 267 (attributing the shale gas boom as a significant reason
for North Dakota’s rise to the top in Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index, Well
Being in America: Shale Gas Buys You Happiness, ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2014,
5:59 PM), www.economist.com’node/21597121.
301. See infra Part IV.B(1) (providing a look at the environmental risks of
fracking).
302. See Joshua Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from the
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in North Dakota, which surpassed California in oil production at
the end of 2011, and Alaska the following year, thus making it the
second largest oil producing state after Texas. 303 While this has
resulted in positive economic results, including increased
employment and increased overall economic activity, which tripled
between 2005 and 2009, there have been social costs. Fershee’s list
includes: pressure on schools due to rapid population increase, widespread housing shortages, infrastructure damage due especially to
high truck traffic and other problems. 304 The “gas play” impact in
West Virginia provides “a boost to the state’s economy … thousands
of job opportunities,” but “not all of the impacts of hydraulic
fracturing in West Virginia have been positive.” 305 Fershee’s
narrative includes typical Boom results. 306
Moreover, fracking production of oil and gas is capital
intensive. This means that investments in the projects only persist
when there is a profit. 307 It means that the impact can be volatile
and enhance vulnerabilities, e.g., with the Boom and Bust scenario.
Environmental concerns will be the host to political problems. And,
as part of the overall energy industry, fracking will expand and
contract, likely causing the real estate implicated to do the same.
While some impacts of the fracking has been positive, the
environmental concerns paralleled those in other fracking
communities: impact of chemicals on the water supply, especially
drinking water; traffic jams and infrastructure damage; migration
of out-of-state contractors who take away jobs from local union
construction workers among other problems. 308

Hydraulic Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 19 TEXAS
WESLEYAN L. REV . 23, 25–30 (2012) (providing detailed information about the
significant impact of the oil and gas industries in the two states, respectively).
303. Id. at 25; see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking from the
Ground Up, 93 TEXAS L. REV . See also 1, 6 (2015) (arguing that many benefits
are not internalized by producers alone, including: “tax revenues from the influx
of well-paid employees, jobs created in supporting industries outside of the oil
and gas sector, and perhaps, increased national security”).
304. Fershee, supra note 302, at 25–27.
305. Id. at 28.
306. Id.
307. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political
Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV . 431, 495 (2013) (recognizing
the profit perspective of the producers).
308. Fershee, supra note 302, 29-30.
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B. Three Categories of Risk are Associated with
Fracking that have Implications for those Owning,
Developing, Financing, Leasing and Using Real
Estate309
1.

Environmental Risks

There is serious concern about fracking’s harm to our water –
both excessive usage and pollution of it at its source. Rhonda G.
Jolley discusses the importance of water to humankind and its place
in the oil and gas industry, including its current use in fracking. 310
She describes the reasons so much water is used in the fracking
process. Water is pumped under pressure to force the rock to
fracture and then “more water …is pumped into the lines to keep
the fractured rock open while the oil or gas is pumped to the
surface.”311 This has resulted in “[m]any landowners accumulating
wealth through the sale of water” and, as long as the policy issues
concerning usage of water are unresolved, she suggests that real
estate and mineral attorneys “must be ready to negotiate water sale
and lease agreements on behalf of clients whether they be
landowners or oil companies.”312 The fact that “several of the states
seeing the biggest increase in oil and gas drilling in recent years …
have experienced prolonged periods of drought” makes water usage
problems a critical concern. 313
Pollution of drinking water has been alleged by anti-fracking
activists who argue that the fracking is going on at much shallower
depths than imagined, putting underground drinking water at
risk. 314 Even the Obama Administration’s early support of fracking
309. Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A
Development Lens for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP.
L. REV . 229, 263 (2015) (identifying the three primary categories of risk that
may “overlap, bleed into and affect each other”).
310. Rhonda G. Jolley, Like Grandma Said, “Oil and Water Don’t Mix,” The
ACREL Papers, ALI-ACREL (Fall 2013); see also TERRENCE S. WELSH, BEYOND
THE FRACKING WARS - A G UIDE FOR LAWYERS , PUBLIC O FFICIALS , PLANNERS ,
AND CITIZENS 237-38 (2013).
311. Id. at 8.
312. Id. at 9 (providing a sample Water Purchase Agreement with comments
at the end of the article).
313. BRENDA L. CLAYTON, K ENNETH M. K LEMM , CHAD M. SMITH, & TYLE R
L. WEIDLICH, THE SHALE ENERGY REVOLUTION – A LAWYERS G UIDE 140-41
(2015) (citing Monika Freyman & Ryan Salmon, Hydraulic Fracturing & Water
Stress: Growing Competitive Pressure for Water 3 (May 2013), www.
ceres.org/resources/reports/hydraulic-fracturing-water-stress-growingcompetitive -pressures-for-water/view).
314. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV . 141, 160 (2015) (providing a history
of some of the research which he puts into the category of “disputed Effects of
Fracking”); see also Neela Banerjee, Oil Companies Fracking into Drinking
Water Sources, New Research Shows, L.A. TIMES (August 12, 2014 9:33 AM),
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was modified after a long awaited study by the Environmental
Protection Agency “confirmed ‘specific instances’ when fracking ‘led
to impacts on drinking water resources, including contamination of
drinking water wells.’”315 The underbalanced drilling (UBD)
recommended by Jim Hughes would not cause water pollution or
extraordinary water usage because no water is used and no
chemicals are inserted into the soil. 316
Whether and to what extent fracking has been responsible for
an increase in earthquakes and other seismic activities depends, to
some extent, on who you ask and when. Science-based studies and
reports issued since 2014 increasingly indicate risks from fracking.
The U.S. Geological Survey has indicated there is a connection
between injecting fracking wastewater into underground disposal
wells and earthquakes. 317
An article entitled “On Shaky Ground: Fracking, Acidizing and
Increased Earthquake Risk in California” refers to long documented
inducement of earthquakes by underground injection of wastewater
from fracking. 318 Austin Holland, then a research seismologist at
the Oklahoma Geological Survey (now with the U.S. Geological
Survey’s Seismic Lab at Albuquerque), made headlines when it was
reported that Oklahoma reported three times as many earthquakes
as in the entire “seismically active state of California. ” 319
www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fracking-groundwater-pavillion-2-140811story.html# page=1 (referring to research released by Stanford University
scientists about the shallower wells, though no direct evidence of water-supply
contamination). See also Zahra Hirji, Drillers Fracking at Much Shallower
Depths than Widely Believed, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 24, 2015),
http://insideclimatenews.org/print/40614 (reporting that the danger is greatest
when high pressure is used in the shallow wells).
315. Neela Banderjee, Fracking has Contaminated Drinking Water, EPA
Now Concludes, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 5, 2015), http://
insideclimatenews.org/news/05062015/frack ing-has-contam inate d-drinkingwater-epa-now-concludes (noting that this report was released by the
administration and EPA “after years of asserting that hydraulic fracturing has
never tainted drinking water”).
316. Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes, Underbalanced Drilling:
Can It Solve the Economic, Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems
Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL. LAW REV . at *31 (forthcoming
2016).
317. William Ellsworth, Jessica Robertson & Christopher Hook, Man-Mad e
Earthquakes Update, UNITED STATES G EOLOGICAL SURVEY (Jan. 17, 2014,
1:00PM), www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/man-made-earthquak e s
(reporting an increase in earthquakes measuring 3.0 or higher in parts of the
U.S.).
318. Jhon Arbelaez, Shaye Wolf & Andrew Grinberg, On Shaky Ground:
Fracking, Acidizing and Increased Earthquake Risk in California, CENTER FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (March 2014), www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaign s
/california_fracking/pdfs/ShakyGroundReport-March2014.pdf.
319. Joe Wertz, Oklahomans feel Way More Earthquakes than Californians;
Now They Know Why, NPR (April 23, 2015 5:25PM), www.npr.org/2015
/04/23/401624166/oklahomans-feel-way-more-earthquakes-than-californiansnow-they-know-why.
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Bloomberg’s Business Week reported that a major donor (Harold
Hamm) to the University and the “billionaire founder of Continental
Resources, one of Oklahoma’s largest oil and gas operators” met
with Holland in November 2013. 320 “During this meeting, Hamm
requested that Holland be careful when publicly discussing the
possible connection between oil and gas operations and a big jump
in the number of earthquakes, which geological researchers were
increasingly tying to the underground disposal of oil and gas
wastewater, a byproduct of the fracking boom that Continental has
helped pioneer.”321
The official report of the U.S. Geological Survey, released on
April 23, 2015, was the “first comprehensive assessment of the link
between thousands of earthquakes and oil and gas operations,
identifying and mapping 17 regions where quakes have
occurred.”322 It indicated particular concern because there is no
scientific way to predict how powerful and potentially damaging the
earthquakes can be. Without insertion of water under pressure in
the underbalanced drilling technique (UBD) of Hughes, the risk of
earthquakes from fracking would be eliminated. 323
Air pollution, especially from the high methane released in
fracking, is on many lists of the environmental risks from fracking
and to climate change as well. 324 Beth Kinne provides a
comprehensive review of the air pollution issues surrounding
fracking. 325 She considers the matter one of “debate” as does David
Spence who places air pollution in the category of “the Disputed
Effects of Fracking.”326
In addition to concerns about how to reduce the environmental
risks of fracking, a question remains as to how these risks will be
dealt with to protect producers, landowners, and communities from
economic consequences. 327

320. Ben Elgin & Matthew Philip, Fracking, Oklahoma Shakes: Big Oil’s
Link to Big Quakes, BUSINESS WEEK, (April 6, 2015).
321. Id. at 20.
322. Richard Perez-Pena, U.S. Maps Where Human Acts Lead to Thousands
of Quakes, N.Y. TIMES , A1 (April 24, 2015) (listing Oklahoma as “by far the
hardest-hit state”).
323. Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes, Underbalanced Drilling:
Can It Solve the Economic, Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems
Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL. LAW REV . (forthcoming 2016).
324. See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr, A Review of Potential Community and
Real Estate Impacts from the Rush to Frack, 39 REAL ESTATE ISSUES 44 (2014)
(mentioning the negative health risks reported by researchers).
325. BETH E. K INNE , BEYOND THE FRACKING WARS – A G UIDE FOR LAWYERS ,
PUBLIC O FFICIALS , PLANNERS AND CITIZENS , Chapter 7 - Clearing the Air:
Reducing Emissions from Unconventional Oil & Gas Development, (Erica
Levine Powers and Beth E. Kinne, ABA Section of State & Local Government)
(2013).
326. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV . 141, 162 (2015).
327. See Tony Dutzik, Benjamin Davis & Tom Van Heeke, Who Pays the
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Social and Community Harms

Shalanda Helen Baker describes what she sees as a significant
but infrequently discussed social risk in the transformation of rural
areas by the fracking Boom. 328 Besides being rural, the places where
fracking makes sense, and occurs, are among the poorest
communities in the U.S. 329 The dilemma is between a community
taking advantage of the predicted economic opportunities while
dealing with the environmental problems fracking threatens. The
“social tensions” flow from the fact that there are winners and
losers. Baker cites the increased costs of everything, including food,
services, homes, and retail goods, as caused by the boomtown
phenomenon. Especially because there is rapid change with
fracking, the social strain often leads to increases in economic stress
for citizens, crime, and drug abuse. 330 While Sorrell E. Negro agrees
that oil and gas development traditionally have been in rural areas,
she expresses her concern that fracking is occurring in more densely
populated areas and in eastern states. 331 From her perspective as a
real estate attorney, she notes the economic boom in places where
fracking occurs: an increase in jobs, an increase in tax revenues, an
increase in incomes, and an increase in value of housing. 332 Negro
urges communities to consider opportunities carefully after they get
information lest they miss opportunities. She provides examples of
communities communicating and working successfully with

Costs of Fracking? Weak Bonding Rules for Oil and Gas Drilling Leave the
Public at Risk, ENVIRONMENT AMERICA RESEARCH & POLICY CENTER (2013)
(recommending that oil and gas producers be required to supply financial
assurances); see also David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach
to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance and the
Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV . 1523
(2014) (arguing that because the industry has more knowledge than regulatory
agencies about the risks, a market based approach of bonding requirements and
mandatory environmental liability insurance is needed).
328. Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A
Development Lens for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP.
L. REV . 229, 266-267 (2015).
329. Id. (reporting that the largest shale plays are in the “hollows that
already bear the scars of coal mining”).
330. Id. at 266.
331. Sorell E. Negro, Looking Below the Surface: Planning for Impacts on
People, Places and Property from Natural Gas Development, 27 PROBATE &
PROPERTY 36 (2013) (writing from a real estate attorney’s perspective about the
impact on a community).
332. Id.; But see Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, A Retrospective Review
of Shale Gas Development in the United States: What Led to the Boom? ,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (April 2013), www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF DP-13-12.pdf (arguing that proximity to fracking sites reduces the fair mark et
value of houses).
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producers in Garfield County, Colorado and Arlington, Texas to
achieve positive outcomes. 333
Sorrell Negro’s narrative in the ABA Section on Energy of
Litigation book, Shale Energy Revolution: A Lawyer’s Guide,
provides the details of changes within several communities where
fracking suddenly hit the scene. 334 While dealing with the
community problems presented by the Boom, including the serious
environmental and social ones described, Negro’s insight that
planning for the Boom must go hand in hand with planning for the
inevitable Bust when the “Drilling Stops” is an important one. 335
Her practical advice provides help for communities and their
attorneys dealing with the social and community harms that
fracking may threaten.
Yet it is the impact that the fracking industry puts on
individuals within the community that may deserve more attention
than it usually receives in discussions of the impact on
communities. 336 For example, does the average home owner realize
that mortgages may not be available on houses located within the
impact area of fracking or that their homeowner’s insurance policy
probably does not cover risks from fracking damage? 337 What about
the possible impact on the broader community distant from the
fracking place and national? Will the secondary mortgage market,
and even the broader financial markets experience another collapse
because of mortgages on leased land?338 And Jared B. Fish analyzes
the behavioral aspects of decision making by landowners who grant
leases to fracking producers. 339 He points out that landowners are
at an “informational disadvantage vis-à-vis industry experts” about
whether this highly technical operation poses any threats. Without

333. Id. at 40.
334. SORELL E. Negro, Man Camps, Boomtowns, and the Boom –and-Bust
Cycle – Learning from Rifle, Colorado and Williams County, North Dakota in
THE SHALE ENERGY REVOLUTION – A LAWYER’S G UIDE , (ABA Section of
Litigation - The Energy Litigation Committee 2013).
335. Id. at 206-209.
336. Ted Gregory, North Dakota Oil Bust Shatters, Shifts Dreams of Illinois
Transplants, CHI . TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2016 4:04 PM), www.chicagotribune.com
/news/ct-oil-fracking-boom-bust-met-20160218-story.html (reveals how three
Chicagoans who went off to the fracking fields in 2013 are faring today: one
committed suicide after the Bust and demonstrated an inability to survive after
leaving the Midwest).
337. See infra Part IV.B(3) (discussing the economic risks of fracking to
individuals, businesses, and communities).
338. Id.; see also Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial
Crisis? A Development Lens for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance,
87 TEMP. L. REV . 229, 267 (2015) (reporting that several industry insiders have
termed the fracking boom as a “Ponzi scheme”).
339. Jared B. Fish, Note: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Behavioral
Analysis of Landowner Decision-Making, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 219 (2012)
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all the relevant information, landowners are inclined “to take the
money and run.”340
Moreover, abandonment of wells is a big issue for the
community. Fracking is driven by profit; when wells dry up or oil
and gas prices drop, companies abandon wells, which means no
more income and may mean leakage of contamination into water
and air supplies. Some companies are unable to afford the cost of
the leased land and file bankruptcy, and leave lands and wells
abandoned. “Landowners would like to have their land to be brought
back to a productive status and have orphaned wells cleaned up.” 341
This affects both the individual landowner who may have been
counting on the royalties (the income) as well as the lenders and
investors in mortgage loans secured by such real estate. 342 Now,
regulations in some jurisdictions try to reduce the likelihood of
“abandoned” and “orphaned” wells, but may not be very effective. 343
Wyoming is setting aside money to begin plugging wells. 344
The impact of fracking activity on fair market value of real
estate for property tax purposes is mentioned in analyzing the
different situations of the winners versus the losers. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ruled that the presence of
contamination and the stigma surrounding contamination are
relevant to determining fair market value for property tax
assessment purposes. 345 While in the past Pennsylvania courts
looked at the cost-to-cure as the basis for determining fair market
value for tax assessment purposes, the Supreme Court, in this case,
held that a 5% stigma reduction in property value was appropriate.

340. Id. at 233-234.
341. Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural
Gas Boom Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/u s/
state-may-act-to-plug-abandoned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gas-boomends.html?_r=0 (quoting Shawn Reese, Wyoming governor’s policy director);
Dimiter Kenarov, Lost: Hunting for Pennsylvania’s Orphaned and Abandoned
Wells, PULITZER CENTER (Jan. 31, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reportin g
/pennsylvania-abandoned-wells-shale-gas-oil-horizontal-drilling-hydraulicfracturing-climate-change.
342. Elisabeth N. Radow, At the Intersection of Wall Street and Main:
Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Residential Property Interests, Risk
Allocation, and Implications for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 77 ALB. L.
REV . 673, 681 (looking at the impact of fracking, particularly for residential real
estate).
343. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to
Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance and the Certain
and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV . 1523, 1527-1528
(2014).
344. See Dan Frosch, State May Act to Plug Abandoned Wyoming Wells as
Natural Gas Boom Ends, N.Y. TIMES A16 (Dec. 25, 2012) (describing efforts at
the state level to deal with over 1200 abandoned mines after the natural gas
boom ended).
345. Harley-Davison Motor Co. v. Springettsbury Twp., 124 A.3d 270 (Pa.
2015).
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Yet, fracking bans may undercut property taxes for the locality.
Robert D. Cheren reports on the three overlapping shale formation
plays (the Devonian, Marcellus and Utica) that cross New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky and
Virginia. 346 There is great variation in the ways fracking is taxed in
the areas of his research. Predominately the activity is taxed using
property taxes or income taxes or both. 347 He concludes that “local
governments that draw little additional revenue from fracking are
more likely to ban the practice because of environmental
concerns.”348 Moreover, that tax revenues would fall after a Bust
seems likely.
Finally, the impact of fracking on infrastructure is relevant
from both a community and economic standpoint. Terrence Welch
points out what he terms “intuitively obvious”: fracking is a
specialized industrial activity requiring use of heavy equipment for
a variety of purposes. 349 He describes the movement of the drilling
rigs, the traffic between the drilling sites and communities where
workers live, and other aspects of a Boom economy as causing
damage especially to roadways. 350 Welch shares a variety of
approaches by local governments to deal with this damage including
requiring performance bonds to get permits, letters of credit
provided by developers, and upfront fees for maintenance of the
infrastructure. Another high stakes infrastructure cost involves
building and supporting housing for new workers. 351 Of course, with
a possibility of decreased activity because of a Bust or, now, because
it is not economical to frack due to reduced energy pricing, one can

346. Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation and Environmental Policy,
64 CASE WESTERN L. REV . 1483 (2014) (noting that bans were almost entirely
confined within New York and a small portion of Pennsylvania in and around
Pittsburgh).
347. Id. at 1491-1499 (providing great detail on how taxing works in tho se
places).
348. Id. at 1483; see also Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes,
Underbalanced Drilling: Can It Solve the Economic, Environmental and
Regulatory Taking Problems Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL. LAW
REV . (forthcoming 2016) (discussing whether a ban or moratorium on fracking
is a taking because of the interference with distinct “investment-backed
expectations”).
349. Terrence S. Welch, Beyond the Fracking Wars – A Guide for Lawyers,
Public Officials, Planners and Citizens 238 (2013); Backyard Drilling: Local
Regulation of Gas Drilling in the Barnett Shale of North Central Texas, ( Erica
Levine Powers & Beth E. Kinne, ABA Section of State & Local Government Law
(2013)).
350. See also SORELL E. NEGRO, THE SHALE ENERGY REVOLUTION – A
LAWYER’S G UIDE 203-204 (ABA Section of Litigation - The Energy Litigatio n
Committee 2013) (describing the necessity to have large number of trucks and
other vehicles to support the fracking operations).
351. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking from the Ground
Up, 93 TEXAS L. REV . 1, 7 (2015) (describing a significant cost to local
governments as fracking comes into a community).
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only wonder whether such measures will cover the systemic risk of
fracking.
3.

Economic

The economic risks and burdens associated with the fracking
industry affect individuals as well as both the local and broader
communities.
a.

Mortgages

Financing using real estate affected by fracking as security for
debt has implications both for the individual landowner and for the
secondary mortgage market. The individual landowner may learn
that if the land it owns is subject to mineral rights for fracking, the
landowner will not be able to get mortgage financing. In addition to
restricting the market for the land, the lack of mortgageability
likely will have a negative impact on fair market value.
Mortgagee permissions or refusals also impact the real estate
industry. Some lenders will not provide mortgages for property that
is adjacent to or the location of drilling. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac require prior approval of a drilling lease. Thus, without
permission of the lender, such fracking activity may trigger a breach
of the loan. Having gas leases on the real estate or even the fact of
gas drilling on adjacent land may also reduce the number of buyers
willing and able to buy a piece of property. 352 In the typical mortgage
loan documents there is a catchall provision that lender’s consent is
required for drilling (“mineral, oil and gas rights rider”). Also,
owners agree to “not use ultrahazardous materials” and to “not
generate waste,” and doing so puts mortgages in “technical default”
with lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 353 Additionally, owners
must disclose
if there are easements,
encroachments,
environmental conditions or land uses when they are seeking a
mortgage appraisal – which often arise as a result of mineral
leases. 354 Another unknown aspect of such mortgages involves how
many exist for land where leases for fracking have been made? It
has been estimated that 90% of all residential mortgages in the U.S.
are sold into the secondary mortgage market. 355 How many
352. Wayne L. Hunsperger and Jean C. Townsend, Real Estate Valuation
Services Phase 1-Fracking Impact Study; Report: Impact of Hydraulic
Fracturing, HUNSPERGER & WESTON, LTD. (Aug. 1, 2014).
353. Jason Notte, Fracking Leaves Property Values Tapped Out, MSN
MONEY (Aug. 23, 2013).
354. Richard J. Roddewig and Rebel A. Cole, Real Estate Value Impact s
from Fracking: Industry Response and Proper Analytical Techniques, REAL
ESTATE ISSUES Vol. 39, Number 3 (2014), www.cre.org/memberdata
/pdfs/RE_Value_Impacts_Fracking.pdf.
355. Elisabeth N. Radow, At the Intersection of Wall Street and Main:
Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Residential Property Interests, Risk
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investors in that market may be affected by fracking Booms and
Busts or liabilities? Is this a repeat of 2008?356
Indeed, the fair market value may decrease for land “affected”
by fracking. This is especially significant for owners whose land is
seen as contaminated by environmental damage or where land was
acquired during the Boom, but is to be sold after the Bust. Ron
Throupe, Robert Simons, and Xue Mao report the findings of a
residential buyer survey given to prospective buyers in Texas
regarding a fracking “heavy” scenario, where there were potential
effects on groundwater and the house was close to the drilling site
that the site itself was visible from the house, and in Florida
regarding a fracking “light” scenario about a house a mile away from
the drilling where the site was not visible from the house. 357 The
results (oversimplified here): only 26% of the Texas respondents
would even consider making a bid on the fracking “heavy” house;
74% would not consider living there. The impact of fracking on fair
market value of residential land near a fracking site is very
negative. 358
Additionally, concerns about the impact of fracking on the
secondary mortgage market result when landowners lease their
land to a producer. The banks hold mortgages to such land, and bear
the risk of the potential decline in fair market value due to
environmental damage or the wide market swings due to Boom and
Bust cycles. 359 The underwriting guidelines set up by lenders to
protect their security interest predate the fracking revolution. 360
The appraisal process required by what may be obsolete
underwriting will not capture what might happen to cause a decline
in value, or to predict how likely such a decline in value is due to
fracking. 361 Elisabeth Radow reports on policies of several local
banks when approached by local borrowers. If the bank decides to
make the loan even though the land would not meet underwriting
standards of the secondary mortgage market, the bank as the
Allocation, and Implications for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 77 ALB. L.
REV . 673, 689 (2013).
356. See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A
Development Lens for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP.
L. REV . 229, 243 (2015) (comparing the 2008 economic Recession caused by
unregulated housing markets and securitized mortgages with the current
investment in fracking).
357. Ron Throupe, Robert Simons & Xue Mao, A Review of Hydro “Fracking”
and its Potential Effects on Real Estate, 23(2), JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE
LITERATURE 205-232 (2013).
358. Id.
359. Ian Urbina, U.S. May Restrict Mortgages on Properties Leased for Oil
and Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES A12 (Mar. 19, 2012).
360. Elisabeth N. Radow, At the Intersection of Wall Street and Main:
Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Residential Property Interests, Risk
Allocation, and Implications for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 77 ALB. L.
REV . 673, 689 (2013).
361. Id.
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originating lender may have to keep that loan and not sell it into
the secondary mortgage market. 362 However, she explains that the
systemic risks are even more serious when the mortgage (likely sold
to the secondary mortgage market) comes first and the mineral
lease is made after the mortgage. There really is no monitoring of
these situations. Although the mortgage terms prohibit the
borrower from transferring the gas lease without the lender’ s
permission, no one knows how many such mortgages there are in
the secondary market. Reliance of investors in the secondary
mortgage market, that their investments are not burdened by risks
of fracking, may be misplaced. 363
b.

Insurance

Insurability for risks associated with fracking also reflects
economic effects on individuals and the broader community. The
standard, non-negotiated gas lease does not include any insurance
for the lessor or any indemnification to protect the landowner.
Unless the parties negotiate otherwise (very unlikely for leases from
homeowners), the risks remain on the landowner. 364 Nor is fracking
covered by the standard homeowner’s insurance policy. Risks like
natural gas and oil drilling are excluded routinely throughout the
country. 365 “According to company spokesman Dave Phillips, State
Farm [Insurance] does not have a fracking endorsement for private
residences, but does have earthquake, earth-movement and
sinkhole endorsements available in most areas.” 366 This lack of
coverage is important because mortgages for residential properties
require such insurance; the absence of the insurance probably
amounts to a breach of the mortgage. 367
Moreover the “under-insured gas industry” discussed by
Radow means that even where liability is clear, there may not be
funds available to pay injured individuals or an injured
community. 368 The insurance industry’s awareness of coverage
issues surrounding the fracking business is seen in a Matthew
Bender publication issued in 2014, Insurance Coverage Issues in
Hydraulic Fracturing. 369 The 10-K disclosure forms that must be

362. Id. at 695.
363. Id. at 696; see also Roger Droin, Fracking Boom Could Lead to Housing
Bust, GRIST (Aug. 16, 2013, 7:57 AM), http://grist.org/climate-energy/frackin g boom-could-lead-to-housing-bust/.
364. Radow, supra note 360, at 682.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. (although there is no requirement of insurance for land that does
not have a mortgage on it). Id.
368. Id. at 685-686.
369. Insurance Coverage Issues in Hydraulic Fracturing, 2014 EMERGING
ISSUES 7295, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. (Dec. 21, 2014). See also John
Mullen & Kim Hollaender, Digging Deep: Fracking Litigation Trends-
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filed by publicly traded gas companies show that such companies
maintain insurance against some risks. However, no disclosure
must be made of whether the company has sufficient assets to cover
uninsured and underinsured liabilities caused by fracking
operations. 370 The ability of local government to cover adequately
all potential loss is described and is challenging in light of the speed
of the industry. 371
Dana and Wiseman propose the use of assurance bonds and
self-reporting to set the standard for regulating because the
“industry” has more knowledge than government agencies. Plus,
they argue that assurance bonds may be used to pay for
contamination clean up even in the absence of liability. 372 In
Wyoming, companies pay a $75,000 blanket bond to cover all of the
wells they operate. Once a well stops producing, the operator must
pay up to $10/linear foot in bonding to offset cost of reclamation. 373
However, bonds are generally inadequate to cover the cost of
plugging. Some companies find ways to avoid financial assurance
requirements altogether. Landowners may be left with insufficient
remedies if a financially-busted company abandons both the well
and the land. 374
Even though fracking poses serious problems to the
environment and climate change, to the community and social
environment and for economic burdens on individuals and society,
there is a call for “cool” analysis that is actually pro science. 375

Insurance Coverage and Liability, CLAIMS MAGAZINE (Jan. 27, 2012),
www.propertycasualty360.com/2012/01/27/digging-deep-frack ing-litigationtrends.
370. Radow, supra note 360, at 685.
371. See infra Part IV.B(2) (describing the social and community harms
caused by fracking).
372. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to
Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance and the Certain
and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV . 1523 (2014); see
also William E. Hefley and Shaun M. Seydor, et al., The Economic Impact of the
Value Chain of a Marcellus Shale Well, PITTBUSINESS at *29 (Aug. 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181675 (“The bond is a financial incentive to ensure
that the operator will perform the drilling operations, address any water supply
problems the drilling activity may cause, reclaim the well site, and properly
plug the well at the end of the wells useful life in accordance with their permit”).
373. Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural
Gas Boom Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/u s/
state-may-act-to-plug-abandoned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gas-boomends.html?_r=0.
374. Tony Dutzik, et al., Who Pays the Costs of Fracking?, ENVIRONMENT
AMERICA RESEARCH & POLICY CENTER (2013), www.environmentamerica.
org/sites/environment/files/reports/Who%20Pays%20the%20Cost%20of%20Fra
cking_vUS%20screen_0.pdf.
375. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV . 141, 172-181 (2015).
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V. CONCLUSION
The science basis for the view that climate change is due to
human activity is now accepted. The magnitude and scope of the
impact that fracking will have on real estate and climate change is
not yet clear. It is clear that if fracking continues, real estate as a
complementary asset will continue to be affected and so will the
industry. If fracking is reduced or eliminated, that too will affect
real estate and the industry. 376 David Spence discusses what he
calls the “undisputed facts” and the “disputed facts” which reflect
confirmation bias depending upon whether one is a developer or an
anti-fracking activist. 377 Spence points out how confirmation bias
makes it difficult to evaluate fracking. This difficulty is significant
particularly at a time when there is consideration of what the public
policy and resulting legal rules should be. 378 Spence urges all to base
conclusions and directions on “cool analysis” that reflect the science.
This also has been the recent conclusion of Michael Levi. 379
Both Spence and Levi are probably correctly identified as pro
fracking. The policy debate continues as we wait for the science to
provide comprehensive facts. Meanwhile, there are the innovators,
like Jim Hughes, who is a developer after all, who is developing a
new technique to avoid some of the clear risks of fracking while
internalizing the benefits. Who can ask for more?

376. See “North Dakota & Bakken Summit: What Impact Has Lower Oil
Prices Had on the Bakken?,” MINNESOTA REAL ESTATE JOURNAL (March 13,
2015) (indicating how important fracking is to the real estate industry in places
where fracking is possible).
377. David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs.
Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV . 141 (2015).
378. See Joshua Fershee, The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from the
Hydraulic Fracturing Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 19 TEXAS
WESLEYAN L. REV . 23 (2012) (concluding that it is important to avoid a
revolution during the evolution of the fracking industry); see also Tony Dutzik ,
Benjamin Davis and Tom Van Heeke, Who Pays the Costs of Fracking?—Weak
Bonding Rules for Oil and Gas Drilling Leave the Public at Risk, ENVIRONMENT
AMERICA RESEARCH & POLICY CENTER (2013), www.frontiergroup.
org/sites/default/files/reports/Who%20Pays%20the%20Cost%20of%20Frack ing
_vUS%20screen.pdf (reporting their recommendations to deal with “this dirty
drilling”).
379. Michael Levi, Fracking and the Climate Debate, DEMOCRACY (2015),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/frack ing-and- the-climate-debate/.

